

Policy networks of organic farming in Europe

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Matthias Stolze

The individual contributions in this publication remain the responsibility of the authors.

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Executive summary

This report presents an analysis of national and supranational organic farming policy networks in Europe. The aim of the national level analysis is to examine the different structures of policy making and how these depend on the country-specific conditions. The aim of the EU level analysis is twofold: firstly, the political structure of organic farming is examined in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); secondly, the research investigates the attitudes of EU level policy makers towards organic farming and their acceptance of specific organic farming policy instruments.

The countries included in the research are Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, England, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Slovenia. Although developing under the umbrella of a common agricultural policy, we find the organic sector and the related policies at different stages of development in different countries. Network analyses were conducted in the eleven countries to reveal the political structures of organic farming. The results of these analyses are used as a basis for a cross-country comparison, from which conclusions are drawn regarding organic farming policy in Europe. The types of organic farming policy networks identified can be differentiated for old and new EU member states but not according to the different sizes of the countries' organic sector. The network analysis assessed the potential of organic farming organizations to influence the policy process. In the context of general farming policy, organic farming organizations have a fairly weak influence whereas the agricultural ministries have a high influence on both policy domains in all countries.

At the EU level, organic farming as a policy domain is a recent development, and arose when the CAP became more sensitive to environmental issues. Quantitative and qualitative methods are applied to explore whether this increasing consideration of environmental aspects had any influence on the development of an organic farming policy network. Above all, we conclude that a network of organic farming policy has not yet been established at the EU level, and organic and general farming policy are perceived as two different policy domains. While the IFOAM EU Group is recognized as the representative for organic farming issues at the EU level, it has a limited influence in general farming policy. Environmental and consumer interest groups are not highly involved in organic farming policy and the most important general farmers' union, the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations in the European Union (COPA), also carries out limited activity in support of organic farming. Nevertheless, based on their attitudes towards organic farming, EU policy actors can be grouped into "supporters", "open" actors, "hesitant" actors, and "critical" actors. Organic farming organizations were placed in the "supporters" group while most environmental organizations were assigned to the "open towards organic farming" group. The different Directorates-General of the European Commission were not found to have a common position towards organic farming. COPA could not be grouped in the same way, due to its lack of responses about its attitude towards organic farming.

The consequences of the political structure for the further development of organic farming policy can only be understood in the broader context.

The political situation of organic farming in Europe varies at the macro level and organic farming organizations face different challenges. The further development of organic farming policy is restricted in general by the limited interest of general farming policy actors, and by the organic farming organizations' lack of resources. Organic farming policy actors can draw up strategies to overcome this limitation and seek suitable partners in the policy process. Three aspects are identified which are relevant in this context:

- i) the centrality of the potential partner, i.e. its reputation and position in the network
- ii) the potential partner's interest in the policy issue under debate
- iii) the extent to which this actor has formulated a clear position towards the issue

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List of abbreviations

ABL	German small farmers' association
AER	Assembly of European Regions
AGRI.A.1	DG AGRI - International affairs; multilateral negotiations
AGRI.C.2	DG AGRI - Economics of agricultural markets; olive oil, horticultural products
AGRI.F.3	DG AGRI - Horizontal aspects of rural development; consistency of rural development
AGRI.F.4	DG AGRI - Horizontal aspects of rural development; agricultural product quality policy
AGRI.H.1	DG AGRI - Agricultural legislation; agricultural law, simplification
BE-BB	Belgian Farmers' Union
BEUC	The European Consumers' Organization
BIRDLIFE	Birdlife International
CAOBISCO	Association of the Chocolate, Biscuits and Confectionery Industries of the EU
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CEE	Central and Eastern European
CEET	Centre for Ecological Engineering, Estonia
CEIBOIS	European Confederation of Woodworking Industries
CEJA	European Council of Young Farmers
CELCAA	European Liaison Committee for the Agri-Food Trade
CIAA	Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries of the EU
CIBC	International Butchers' Confederation
CoAM	Council of Agricultural Ministers
COCERAL	Committee of Cereals, Feedstuff, Oilseeds, Olive oil, Oils and Fats and Agrisupply Trade by the EU
CoFM	Council of Ministers of Finance
COMM	European Commission
COPA	Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations in the European Union
COUNCIL	European Council
CPE	European Farmers' Coordination
CZ-CZAC	Czech Farmers' Union
DEFRA	Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (UK)

DG	Directorate-General
DG AGRI	Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development
DG DEV	Directorate-General for Development
DG ENVI	Directorate-General for Environment
DG RTD	Directorate-General for Research
DG SANCO	Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection
DG TRADE	Directorate-General for Trade
ECOSOC	European Economic and Social Committee
ECOVAST	European Council for the Village and Small Town
EEA	European Environmental Agency
EEB	European Environmental Bureau
EFFAT	European Federation of Trade Unions in the Food, Agriculture and Tourism sectors and allied branches
EFNCP	European Forum for Nature Conservation and Pastoralism
ELO	European Landowners' Organization
EOFF	European Organic Farmers Federation
EP	European Parliament
EP-AGRI	Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament
EPHA	European Public Health Alliance
EU	European Union
EUROCOMM	Eurocommerce
EUROCOOP	European Community of Consumer Cooperatives
Eurogroup	Eurogroup on animal welfare
Euromontana	Euromontana
EUROSTAT	Eurostat
EURO-TOQUES	European Community of Chefs
FEFAC	European Feed Manufacturers' Federation
FIAO	Federation of Italian Organic Agriculture
FIBL	Research Institute of Organic Agriculture, Switzerland
FOEE	Friends of the Earth Europe
FUD	Standing Committee on Food, Agriculture and Fisheries of the Parliament, Denmark
FVE	Federation of Veterinarians Europe
GMO	Genetically modified organisms
IEEP	Institute for European Environmental Policy
IFOAM	International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements
IUCN	The World Conservation Union

JRC.D.8	Joint Research Centre, unit D.8
KEZ	Inspection of organic farming, Czech Republic
LV-LZF	Lithuanian Farmers' Union
MTR	Agenda 2000 Midterm Review
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NL-LTO	Dutch Farmers' Union
OFC	Organic food council, Denmark
OXFAM	Oxfam
PR AT	Permanent Representation at the EU of Austria
PR CZ	Permanent Representation at the EU of the Czech Republic
PR DK	Permanent Representation at the EU of Denmark
PR EE	Permanent Representation at the EU of Estonia
PR HU	Permanent Representation at the EU of Hungary
PR LU	Permanent Representation at the EU of Luxembourg
PR SE	Permanent Representation at the EU of Sweden
PR SI	Permanent Representation at the EU of Slovenia
PR SK	Permanent Representation at the EU of Slovakia
PR UK	Permanent Representation at the EU of the United Kingdom
PRO-BIO	Association of organic farmers, Czech Republic
SA	Soil Association
SCO	Standing Committee for Organic Farming
SE-LRF	Swedish Farmers' Union
TRADE.G.2	DG TRADE - Agriculture, fisheries, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, biotechnology
TRADE.G.3	DG TRADE - Sustainable development (including trade and environment); dialogue with civil society
UECBV	European Livestock and Meat Trading Union
UK-NFU	National Farmers Union (UK)
VAT	Value added tax
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

Country abbreviations

AT	Austria
CH	Switzerland
CZ	Czech Republic
DE	Germany
DK	Denmark
EE	Estonia
GR	Greece
ENG	England
ES	Spain
HU	Hungary
IT	Italy
LU	Luxembourg
PL	Poland
SI	Slovenia
UK	United Kingdom

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Organic farming is rooted in a social movement that emerged out of opposition to mainstream farming. Rather than engaging in public protest against an established policy, it opposed the predominant way of farming by demonstrating an alternative. The concept of organic farming has been developed by producers and interested individuals since the 1920s and sustained by consumers through specialist markets, particularly since the 1970s. People with an environmental concern have supported the organic movement as part of an environmentally friendly life style. In consequence, the organic movement unites a plurality of perspectives.

In recent years, this organic movement has increasingly become a focus of policy interest in Europe. European Union countries now support organic farming through agri-environmental programmes and action plans, among other instruments. These policy interventions aim at both supporting consumer choice through development of the market for organic food and encouraging the provision of public goods through support for organic land management (Lampkin & Stolze 2006). In addition, with the Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 the state, i.e. the EU, provides the legal framework for organic production, processing, labelling, inspection and certification and thus defines what organic farming is (Dabbert 2001). In consequence, the concept of organic farming is now increasingly shaped by actors outside the organic movement.

The emerging policy field of organic farming met the established field of general agricultural policy which had been functioning in a relatively closed policy arena up to then. Policy actors that represented a social movement with its pluralist interests were something new in this policy area. Understandably, these cultural differences, together with the question of ownership of the “organic idea”, evoked a confrontation between organic and established mainstream agriculture and the various representatives.

Whilst gaining political importance, actors in the organic farming policy field have to face a twofold, somewhat contradictory challenge: On the one hand they conceive of organic farming policy as an alternative, an antipode to traditional general agricultural policy. But on the other hand organic farming is strongly regulated by the state and highly dependent upon the super-ordinate agricultural policy arena (Lampkin & Stolze 2006). Organic representatives – though based in a social movement – thus have to engage with general farming policy actors.

Organic farming has not developed equally in the various countries of Europe. Although evolving under the shared roof of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), countries have travelled the path of institutional organic farming development unevenly so far, resulting in different shares of organic farming within the overall agricultural sector

(Michelsen et al. 2001). It is therefore interesting to compare the political structures of organic farming in different countries. National-level agricultural policy in the EU is strongly determined by the CAP, of which organic farming policy is a sub-domain. For this reason, we also address the political structure of organic farming at the EU level.

Against that backdrop this book addresses questions about the structure of organic farming policy. Who has power and how is the decision-making process organized? Which institutions are involved and is the plurality of the social movement reflected in the political structure? A further aim of this report is to study the relationship between the organic and the general farming policy field.

The national-level analyses were undertaken in old (AT, DK, DE, IT, UK) and new (CZ, EE, HU, PL, SI) member states, as well as in CH. The distinction between old and new EU member states refers to the major differences in the countries' socio-economic histories. Furthermore, countries can be distinguished by their organic sector's stage of development. Austria (AT), Denmark (DK) and Switzerland (CH) are included as representatives of those countries with a more developed organic sector, whereas the United Kingdom (UK) and Italy (IT) are included as examples of countries with a less developed organic sector. Finally, Germany (DE) is included as the largest organic market in Europe. By contrast, in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries the organic sector is still at an early stage and relatively small.

At the EU level, the report presents an overview of the actors involved in organic farming policy making and shows how they collaborate. Alliances are identified and we ask how the two policy domains of organic and general farming interact. In addition to this structural perspective, we examine the attitudes of EU-level policy makers towards organic farming, their knowledge about it and their acceptance of specific organic farming policy instruments and strategies.

The book is structured as follows. After a description of the policy environment of organic farming at both the EU and the national level, we present the methodology and theoretical background applied. In chapter 3 we compare the eleven national networks of organic farming policy and discuss them by focussing on the role of the organic sector. Chapter 4 focuses on the EU level. Actors involved in organic farming policy making are described and we investigate their position in and interactions with the CAP in chapters 4.1 and 4.2. Chapter 4.3 then addresses the acceptance of various policy instruments that could be implemented as part of an encompassing organic farming policy strategy. Finally, chapter 5 draws conclusions about the political structure of organic farming in Europe, and its implications for the activity of organic farming policy actors.

1.2 The political environment of organic farming in Europe

Compared to the long history of the European Common Agricultural Policy, organic farming policy developed only recently as a sub-issue of

this field. For about 50 years, the CAP developed a strong framework for every agricultural policy issue in the EU.¹

To better understand the options and constraints for policy actors in organic farming policy, it is helpful to understand the characteristics of the policy structures and the context they operate in.

1.2.1 European agricultural policymaking

European agricultural policymaking follows what is known as the consultation procedure. This procedure precedes consultation of the European Parliament (EP), and does not need the parliaments' consent. The two main institutions involved in this process are the European Commission (COMM) and the Council of Agricultural Ministers (CoAM). The COMM proposes certain legislation and the CoAM takes the final decision regarding legislation. The roles of these organizations are detailed in the European Treaties and will not be discussed here. Therefore, decisions regarding the CAP are made by a multi-level system of government: the national ministries of agriculture are part of the intergovernmental system of the CoAM, forming a supranational system together with the COMM and the European Parliament (European Commission 2003).

EU policy, however, is not only a product of interaction between these European institutions (for our purposes we are limiting the term "European institution" to the three institutions of EU policy and administration described above). It also involves civil society. Institutions with their well defined role are confronted with interest groups that lobby at the two levels of government: national and EU level. Alongside the European institutions, we find both national interest groups and supranational interest groups in the form of peak organizations representing different interests. However, it would be too simple to assume that supranational groups lobby at the EU level and national interest groups only work at the national level and thus only try to influence EU policy in an indirect way via the intergovernmental route. In agricultural policy, even though supranational peak organizations will primarily target European institutions, they also target national governments (mainly by targeting a national government's permanent representation at the EU) (Pappi & Henning 1999). We also find a number of national interest groups that are active not only at national level but also at the EU level. National farmers' organizations often have an office in Brussels as a basis for lobbying. Pappi and Henning (1999) identified three principal strategies of national interest-group lobbying: The first is the direct national strategy where interest groups seek to access the intergovernmental European system through their own governments or permanent representatives at the EU. The second is the indirect supranational strategy that works through the

¹ The development of the CAP is in turn influenced by worldwide institutions like the WTO and other international agreements.

European peak organization. Finally, national interest groups can lobby the supranational EU institutions directly, independently from their peak organizations. This multilayer structure of possible interest-group lobbying gets even more complex when we consider that, within the COMM, various Directorates-General (DGs) are often responsible for one policy issue, and boundaries between them are not clearly defined (Peters 2001).

Peters (2001) argues that, in general, the fragmented policy process, both at EU level and between the EU and the national level opens up various opportunities for interest groups to influence decision-making. The nature of the EU institutions as an “adolescent bureaucracy”, as he puts it, assists the possibilities for interest groups to approach the decision-makers in different ways. The result is a complex structure with various possibilities for interest groups to lobby. Mazey and Richardson (2001) see a positive point in favour of interest-group lobbying in a complex structure of policy making. They suggest that, in a complex environment, both the Commission and the interest groups have an interest in forming stable policy communities and networks, because a stable situation is preferred to an uncertain situation. Being a member of a stable policy community creates further opportunity structures for interest groups.

With regard to the CAP, different authors believe that interest groups have less influence and the institutions have a far greater influence. After discussing both the institutional framework and the interest-group framework, Kay (2000) concludes that “the most important mechanism behind CAP reforms is the interaction of EU institutions and member state governments”. He gives three reasons for this assessment. First, the most important farm interest group, the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations in the European Union (COPA) had little influence on the CAP reforms in the 1980s and 1990s even though it had been represented in a number of bodies involved in the policy process. The COMM and the CoAM proved to be more influential in terms of policy outcomes. Second, at a national level, farmers’ organizations compete with ministries and lobby groups from other policy areas on the distribution of the national budget and the focus of national policy. Third, even if such national interest groups are successful at the national level, they do not have any influence on the discussion going on in the CoAM which follows its own rules. In the Council, all member states have to find a compromise, but mostly they are not willing to move far from their initial positions. Daugbjerg (1999) states that institutions have a high influence whereas interest groups have a relatively low influence. Pappi and Henning’s (1999) network analysis on the organization of influence on the CAP supports this statement with regard to the EU level. They conclude that for the Commission contacts within the political sector, i.e. with other institutions, are of higher importance than contacts with the EU farmers’ lobby. A further argument for the limited power of interest groups in the CAP is given by their own characteristics. Even though interest groups are described as more flexible and less constrained in their lobbying activities than national states, they are characterized as fairly slow policy actors (Mazey & Richardson 2001). Complex internal decision making processes and a lack of resources limit

their ability to take part in European policy processes (Mazey & Richardson 2001). We conclude that, although in theory an adolescent bureaucracy such as the EU opens up lobbying options for interest groups, in the case of the CAP the strong involvement of national governments limits the possibilities for civil society organizations to achieve their goals.


The network approach has proved to be a useful tool to make the complex structure of EU agricultural policy process more tangible and to help understand the role and options of interest-group involvement. First we will present the formal structures for interest-group participation provided by the EU institutions and then move on to presenting results from an analysis of the informal network as completed by Henning and Wald (2000).

Interest groups become involved in the formal decision-making process of the CAP through 31 Agricultural Advisory Committees. These are 30 Advisory Groups that focus on the different commodities or on environmental, rural development and health issues (European Commission 2004a), and the “Green Group of the Eight” comprising eight interest groups focussing on environmental issues. The advisory committees meet several times a year and consult the COMM during the decision-making phase of the policy process. When a committee adopts a proposal unanimously it may instruct the COMM to communicate the proposal to the CoAM. The COMM is not bound to the results of the advisory committees, but it sets great value on them and reports to the committee members how it has taken account of their views (European Commission 2004a). Committee members represent various socio-economic interests: agricultural producers and agricultural cooperatives, the agricultural and food-manufacturing industries, the agricultural products and foodstuffs trade, farm workers and workers in the food industry, consumers and environmentalists. Agricultural producers and agricultural cooperatives (primarily represented by COPA) hold around 50% of the seats in each of the Advisory Groups (except in the “Green Group of the Eight”) which is evidence of their potential influence in the decision-making process. Currently 117 interest groups are registered (European Commission 2004b) and hold a seat in at least one Agricultural Advisory Committee.

Figure 1-1 illustrates the prominent position of COPA in the formal agricultural policy network of the EU, and shows that interest groups of workers (the European Federation of Trade Unions in the Food, Agriculture and Tourism sectors and allied branches, EFFAT), consumers (the European Consumers’ Organization, BEUC) and environmentalists (e.g. the European Environmental Bureau, EEB, the World Wildlife Fund, WWF and Birdlife International, BIRDLIFE) are represented in a number of Advisory Groups. Interest groups of the agricultural products and foodstuffs trade (Eurocommerce, EUROCOMM, the Committee of Cereals, Feedstuff, Oilseeds, Olive oil, Oils and Fats and Agrisupply Trade by the EU, COCERAL, and the European Livestock and Meat Trading Union, UECEBV) and the agri-industry (the Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries of the EU, CIAA, the International Butchers’ Confederation, CIBC, and the

Association of the Chocolate, Biscuits and Confectionary Industries of the EU, CAOBISCO) are members of fewer advisory committees; this may be due to their focus on specific commodities. The same is true for the large number of interest groups that are represented only on those one or two advisory committees that address their specific interests.

Figure 1-1: Membership of interest groups in Agricultural Advisory



Note: the chart shows only interest groups which are members of at least five advisory committees

Source: European Commission (2004b)

These advisory committees have a consultative function in the policy process; however, it has been argued that interest groups have a limited influence in this process. The member organizations of the advisory committees often value the possibility for information exchange with other stakeholders higher than the direct influence capability in the policy process. Hence, interest groups use formal structures to cultivate their informal networks. Such networks were examined by Henning and Wald (2000) with regard to the McSharry reform of EU agricultural policy in 1992. In the course of the NACAP (Network Analysis of the Common Agricultural Policy) project they interviewed 124 policy actors – state institutions and interest groups at the national and supranational (EU) levels. Henning and Wald (2000) analysed their position in the network on the basis of information exchange, political support, personal relations, exchange of political favours and sending of petitions. One result of this network analysis was that EU institutions are better integrated into the system of information exchange than interest groups. This supports the views of Daugbjerg (1999) and Kay (2000). The network analysis further identified the importance of different groups of lobby organizations. Henning and Wald (2000) conclude that national

organizations of the agricultural trade and the agri-industry, as well as some supranational organizations of the agri-industry, play a minor role in the CAP network. Other supranational interest groups from the agri-industry, and national interest groups of agricultural producers, are better integrated in the system. The most influential interest group is the European umbrella organization of agricultural producers, COPA. It should be pointed out that Henning and Wald (2000) did not consider interest groups of environmentalists in their analysis as they were not seen as important actors; the consumers' organization BEUC was grouped as one of a number of poorly integrated interest groups.

To conclude, the general agricultural policy network of the EU is dominated by the legislative institutions, the Commission and the Council of Agricultural Ministers. The European Parliament is involved in the consultation procedure. Interest groups have various possibilities for influencing agricultural policy on the national and supranational levels. However, their importance in the policy-making process remains limited. The European peak organization of agricultural producers, COPA, plays a highly influential role relative to other interest groups. Still, COPA's overall impact on policy outcomes is debatable.

1.2.2 The development of EU organic farming policy in the broader policy context

General agricultural policy, with its network of policy actors, forms the framework for organic farming policy. Organic farming policy has developed as a sub-issue of EU policy from 1988 onwards. In 1988 the Council adopted an extensification programme as Regulation (EEC) No 4115/88 that provided the basis for the first large-scale support programme for organic farming in the EU (Lampkin et al. 1999). It was followed in 1992 by the Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 on organic production of agricultural products (European Commission 2000b). Upcoming issues were continuously added, in particular in 1999 when the Council extended the scope of the regulation to organic livestock production. Building on this legal definition of organic farming, the first regulation specifically mentioning organic farming was regulation (EEC) No 2078/92 (now replaced by 1257/99), which provided opportunities for financial support of organic production from 1994 onwards.

The official recognition of organic farming at the EU level should be considered in the broader policy context of the McSharry reform in 1992, which represented a clear change in the orientation of the CAP. At this time, the technical progress allowing for intensifying agricultural production and the market support policy had resulted in surplus production of many commodities and detrimental effects on the environment. In this context, organic farming was seen as a way of both relieving the market and helping to conserve the environment. At the same time, consumers were increasingly demanding products with individual characteristics, such as controlled geographical origin or special quality (European Commission 2000b). Organic products could thus be placed in the niche market of quality products. However, in spite of the increasing demand for organic products, there was no clear

definition of what constituted an organic product and how it was to be labelled. Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 addressed these issues. In 1999, the Austrian Government and the Commission held a conference on the prospects of organic farming for the 21st century and the idea of a European action plan for organic farming was raised. A conference organized by the Danish government in Copenhagen in May 2001 elaborated this idea further and led to the CoAM inviting the COMM in June 2001 to consider a European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming. The COMM – not involved in the Danish conference – published a paper analysing the possibilities for such an action plan in 2002. In 2003, an online consultation of the European Commission followed, as well as a hearing of the European Parliament. The consultation process culminated in a hearing of the Commission in January 2004 and finally led to publication of the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming in June of the same year (European Commission 2004c).

The new orientation of the CAP not only had consequences for the content of policies, but also for the structure of policy making, particularly the participation of civil society organizations. Until the early 1990s, agricultural policy institutions took account of interest groups representing producers, industry, trade and consumers. The new focus of agricultural policy on the link between farming and environment facilitated the inclusion of a new interest group: the environmentalists. The views of this group of lobbyists were increasingly taken into account by the EU. Subsequently new interest groups arose, in particular, the IFOAM EU group (IFOAM EU) as the European branch of the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements. IFOAM EU was founded in 1992 and has maintained an office in Brussels since 2003.

Although they had been set up by various Commission decisions since 1962, in 1998 the provisions relating to the Agricultural Advisory Committees were consolidated in a single decision (European Commission 1998). This is the first time that an Advisory Group on Organic Farming is mentioned. In 2004, the Commission decided to renew the advisory structure once again as a response to the CAP reforms of 1999 and 2003, as well as to EU enlargement (European Commission 2000a). Only then were environmentalist interest groups explicitly mentioned as a distinct socio-economic group whereas in the preceding legislative documents they had been subsumed under the group of “others” (Menendez-Vallina 2005). This development of the advisory structure points to a growing importance of environmental groups in the last few years. Currently, environmental interest groups are represented on a considerable number of advisory committees, but mostly hold only one to two seats on each of them. In a few cases they hold a more significant position, such as the Advisory Group on Agriculture and Environment and the Advisory Group on Rural Development (European Commission 2004a).

1.2.3

Organic farming policy in European countries

European legislation is the basis for national level organic farming policies. At this level, organic farming has increasingly been introduced as a policy instrument (Dabbert et al. 2004). We will now take a closer look at the political structures that developed.

The first national organic farming schemes appeared in the late 1980s. In some countries such as AT they were based solely on national law, in others such as DE, FR and LU they were based on the European extensification programme, Regulation (EEC) No 4115/88 (Lampkin et al. 1999). From 1994 on, organic farming was supported in many European countries through Regulation (EEC) No 2078/92. As a consequence, actors from the organic sector increasingly had to interact with public and private policy actors of agricultural policy (Stolze 2003) and institutions involved in organic farming policy developed. Moschitz et al. (2004) described and analysed the development of these political institutions from 1997 to 2003 in eleven European countries. Following the structure of their report, we will sum up the institutional development of organic farming in three country groups.

Countries with a large share of organic farming

Common to countries with a large share of organic farming is that the major changes of agricultural policy which influenced organic farming took place in the early nineties and thus, seen from today's perspective, the policy environment for organic farming can be considered as fairly stable. Organic farming is broadly accepted by general agricultural policy, and recently policy issues not exclusively linked to organic farming have gained importance in the political debate. The debate about the introduction of genetically modified organisms (GMO) into agriculture is mentioned as an issue that assembles organic farming policy actors and environmental groups, but discussion focussed purely on organic farming policy is rare. Having said that, in AT, during the time of network interviews, a new umbrella organization of organic farming associations was developing. What were the three main organic farming organizations are now united under the name of BIO AUSTRIA. Overall, Moschitz et al. (2004) conclude that organic farming has found its way into mainstream agricultural policy in the countries with a large share of organic farming. The organic sector is highly accepted as a strong movement in DK and CH, whereas in AT the sector is still fighting for full recognition by all policy actors.

Countries with an average share of organic farming

In countries with an average share of organic farming (DE, ENG, IT) the political situation of organic farming has been changing in recent years. Considering the period from 2000 to 2003 in Germany and England, the state became more and more involved and action plans were published. In Germany the most important changes took place when there was a change of agricultural minister in the winter of 2000/2001 and agricultural policy focussed on organic farming specifically; and, in England, an organic action plan was published in 2002 after a period of

discussions within a working group which had been set up by the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). In both cases, changes in public policy opened up possibilities for private actors to become involved in organic farming policy making. In England there was a strong emphasis on market development. In Italy the political situation of organic farming is fairly complex with responsibilities dispersed over the different regions and the central government (Moschitz et al. 2004). A national organic action plan has been recently approved by the national government and accepted by the regional governments, but not yet implemented.

The new EU member states

For all CEE countries the accession process to the European Union has been a strong incentive to adopt organic farming policy. Most of the legislation concerning organic farming has thus been put in place during the pre-accession period, from 1997. When the countries finally acceded to the EU in 2004, no major changes had to be undertaken to implement the EU regulations on organic farming policy (Hrabalova et al. 2005). Many policy changes have thus been triggered by an external impulse, with the national states (i.e. the public administration) as an intermediary. It is reported that the political structures for organic farming are changing rapidly. At the time of writing this report, all the CEE countries studied except for Poland are preparing or implementing a national action plan on organic farming. In the Czech Republic the organic farming organization PRO-BIO has been playing an active role in shaping the organic farming policy since the early 1990s and the organic sector is one of the most developed compared to the other accession countries. In Hungary the organic sector has historically been oriented towards export so that market actors are fairly important. Until the accession in 2004 the Polish government and administration had not been very active in organic farming policy and thus the accession led to some important changes in organic farming legislation. Experts assess that the Polish public administration will step up its activity in the organic sector in the future.

2 Methodology and theoretical background

This chapter firstly introduces the theoretical background and the main concepts of network analysis. The second part of the chapter describes approaches adopted in the project.

2.1 Theoretical background of the network approach

The notion of policy networks developed in the social sciences in the 1970s and 80s as a response to the contemporary development of the public process (Kenis & Schneider 1991). Instead of looking at policy making as a hierarchical process or dividing policy processes into two types, pluralism versus corporatism, network analysis considers the multitude of actors influencing a policy process. From there on, the network approach was broadened further and is now applied with two different meanings (Schneider 1992). Firstly, it is used in a more metaphorical manner to characterize an action system that lacks a clear hierarchy of decision making. Secondly, a policy network formally describes any pattern of interrelationship among actors. In our study we use the latter, more neutral application of the term. We will use Van Waarden's (1992) notion of policy network as a generic term to characterize public-private relations.

Various authors (see Kenis & Schneider 1991; Jordan & Schubert 1992; Van Waarden 1992; Wassermann & Faust 1999) assert that the network perspective opens up a promising possibility to describe and explain complex relationships between actors in politics and society. It lays a sound basis for structural analysis of public and private actor configurations (Schneider 1992) and provides a new, powerful option to answer standard social science questions. Wasserman and Faust (1999) stress that the policy network perspective developed as an integral part of advances in social theory, empirical research and formal mathematics and statistics so that the method is well grounded in application and theory. They point out that the unit of analysis – from the network perspective – is no longer the individual (or an individual organization, respectively), but the entity consisting of a set of actors and the set of links between them. Underlying principles of the network approach are:

- i) Actors and actions in a network are interdependent upon rather than independent from each other
- ii) Linkages between actors are channels for the transfer of material or immaterial resources (e.g. money, personnel, information, political support)
- iii) Network structures may open up opportunities or be constraining for the actors involved
- iv) Structure (social, economic or political) is a lasting pattern of relations among actors

Networks can thus be seen as institutionalized exchange relationships (Van Waarden 1992). Network analysis provides the researcher with a

number of objective measures describing networks in different contexts, such as different countries, and thus lays the basis for further investigation on patterns of relationship (Windhoff-Héritier 1993). Windhoff-Héritier (1993) argues that network analysis goes beyond formal institutional decision making as it combines different explanatory approaches from different theoretical backgrounds, and attempts to explain the emergence of political decisions within the context of interacting public and private actors.

Thatcher (1998) showed that network analysis is used in three different roles that are often bound together rather than being clearly distinguished. Firstly, network analysis involves a description of linkages and interactions amongst actors involved in policy making. Results are used to generate network categories and to develop a typology of networks. For a comparison of networks between countries (as in our case), such a description of the national networks is a starting point. A second application of network analysis is to take it as a variable that depends on different factors, such as the institutional environment and the ideas and strategies of the actors involved. The development of networks is affected by the existing institutions of agricultural policy as well as the role organic farming plays for general agricultural policy, and the characteristics of the actors involved will influence how they work together in policy making. The third role that network analysis can take is exactly the opposite perspective: a network is seen as an independent variable, as an intervening factor that affects (selected) aspects of network actor behaviour and policy outcome. In this case, the initial distribution of resources is taken as given. This way of applying network analysis is useful to arrive at hypotheses on how the network position affects the strategies of the organic farming sector or the role organic farming plays for a country's policy.

The first role of network analysis identified by Thatcher (1998) is descriptive and does not affect conclusions on the function of policy networks in the policy process. Thatcher's second and third roles introduce circular linkages which makes it difficult to keep cause and effect strictly separated. We will start here by looking at factors influencing the development of policy networks before showing how feedback processes in established networks work back on them. Kenis (1991) pointed out that the development of networks depends on various factors so that it is challenging to formulate a clear theory. There is no simple linear causal model that explains the development of networks. He identifies a single general explanatory theory of the institutional structure of the nation-state. Kenis (1991) stresses the importance of a mutual meeting ground of the state and private policy networks. The state has to develop a decentralized, cooperative, policy decision-making structure. Then private networks can contribute to the policy process.

Given these preconditions, there are various factors that influence how policy networks develop. Firstly, the formal institutional framework affects the nature and impact of policy networks (Thatcher 1998). Regarding our focus of research, the main institutional impetus may come from the transformation process in the CEE countries. Institutional

preconditions vary between countries that have been members of the EU for a long time and those that have acceded to the EU only recently. Furthermore, the accession process has pushed institutions in these countries to change and it is often judged as one of the driving forces for policy change (e.g. Moschitz et al. 2004). Even without such a major change as the transformation from a communist to a capitalist system, new institutions can be established and open up options for interest groups to join in networks. Secondly, changes in the economic and technological characteristics of policy will influence the development of networks. With regard to organic farming the role of the market has to be taken into consideration. Different actors will be involved in the networks and the importance of policy as a driving force will differ according to the influence of the market. Thatcher (1998) asserts that ideas, values and knowledge also influence the development of policy networks. On the state side, changes in political orientation influence the opportunities for interest groups to become active in a network or for new networks to be established. If organic farming gains in importance for a government, (e.g. as a model for sustainable agriculture) the influence of organic sector actors and the general farming sector actors in the policy process and participation in networks will change. On the non-governmental side, the culture and ideology of the interest groups determine their active participation in policy networks. For example, an organic farming information dissemination organization may not be willing to participate in a policy network. Organizations with a strong desire to participate in policy making might be constrained by a lack of resources or capacity. To conclude, many factors will influence how organic farming policy networks develop and it will not be easy to deduce universally valid conclusions.

We now discuss the role of policy networks as an independent variable which influences policy outcomes and actor behaviour. Policy outcome in our case is not easily identified. The study surveyed eleven national networks on organic farming. To keep the influence of EU policy comparable, it was decided to focus on a similar time period to analyse the national networks: winter 2003/04. It was not possible to focus on a clearly defined policy process, e.g. the development of an organic farming regulation. In consequence, existing policies on organic farming are regarded in their entirety as the outcome of long-lasting policy making by the network described, but this is only an approximate measurement. The share of organic farming in a country cannot be seen as a direct outcome of policy, as there are many other confounding factors (see Bichler et al. 2005a; Bichler et al. 2005b). Thatcher (1998) argues that the type of policy network influences the nature of policy change. Pluralist or state-directed networks are more likely to produce radical change and paradigm shifts, whereas corporatist networks cause paradigm shifts through cumulative change. In addition, policy networks influence the behaviour of the actors involved. Actors pursue strategies that result in new political and economic forces, which in turn determine their power in the policy network. If an organic sector actor in one country became involved in the policy process once, it could endeavour to open up the network to other actors. Through participation in one process, an actor will have the opportunity to become increasingly

involved in further policy making processes and thus strengthen its position in the network.

So far, we have outlined the theoretical concept of policy network analysis and the different ways in which it is used. It has been shown that characteristics of the actors involved both influence the development of a network and, at the same time, are themselves affected by the network structure. We will now take a closer look at the role civil society groups can play in a policy process.

Ideology and ideas of organic sector organizations not only influence the network structure they work in. They are one determining factor for their access to decision-making domains and for the ability of organizations to influence policy outcomes. Casey (2004) argues the importance of the number of organizations that are part of a social movement and the nature of these organizations. Transferred to organic farming policy, the question is what role environmental or consumer organizations play in policy making. It is furthermore of interest how they are accepted by the other policy actors involved, e.g. by the general farming organizations and the state. Only when those organizations are open to organic sector organizations will organic sector organizations have the possibility to bring forward their points of view. Furthermore, there are internal factors that determine the political influence of organic sector organizations. One is the self-perception of organic sector groups. Besides having an impact on their willingness to join policy networks, this will also influence their ambitions in shaping policy outcomes. Another point (and often an important limiting factor) for non-governmental interest groups is their limited resources. This may constrain their level of activity and their political power regardless of their willingness to participate in the policy process. This is true for many organic farming organizations that – in contrast to most general farming organizations – have fewer members and therefore have only limited financial resources. Casey (2004) identifies a final factor determining the access of interest groups to decision-making processes, this being their proximity to the centre of the network. Again the complex interaction between different influencing factors is made obvious in this link between characteristics and networks of policy actors.

With the discussion of the different roles of networks and the various characteristics of network actors involved, the internal forces of the organic sector and their interaction with other policy actors has been highlighted. Casey (2004) widens this perspective and refers to two framework conditions that influence the ability of non-governmental organizations to influence policy:

The first framework condition is the importance of the policy issue in question – in our case, organic farming – for policy in general, and specifically for agricultural policy. It has been argued before that the organic farming policy network can increase the importance of organic farming policy in the broader context. Increased importance in the broader context, for its part, influences the political options of the organic sector. This demonstrates the complexity of cause and effect

relationships, as discussed previously in relation to the theoretical considerations of networks and interest-group influence.

The second framework condition of interest-group influence is the socio-economic environment in a country. This factor has already been drawn on for explaining the development of policy networks. One can easily understand that besides influencing policy structures the different historical development of socio-economic conditions has a direct impact on the influence exerted by interest groups on a system. For example, in a direct democracy built upon plebiscite (such as Switzerland), interest groups play a different role in policy making than in indirect democracies built upon parliamentary processes.

Again the interactions between socio-economic conditions, network development and the influencing options of interest groups make it difficult to arrive at clear conclusions. We have outlined these interactions to address the complexity as the basis for the interpretation of the network analysis results.

2.2 Main concepts and measures applied in network analysis

This section gives an overview over selected concepts of network analysis and how they have been applied in the project. The concepts applied in this study are based on a number of well known references on network analysis, such as Wassermann & Faust (1999), Scott (2000), Jansen (2003) and Freeman (1978/79).

A network as we use it is formally defined as a set of actors (or nodes) and a set of relationships (or ties, edges) connecting them. Prior to an analysis one has to decide which actors or nodes to include in the network. In our case, the nodes in the networks are institutions and organizations involved in organic farming policy making in their country.

In general, relationships in a network can be either undirected links between two actors or arcs that lead from one actor as a source to another as receiver (e.g. of information). This distinction is important for both analysis and interpretation of network data, as will be shown below. In our network analysis we investigated the collaboration and contacts between the network actors on issues of organic farming policy. It was specified whether this was a close or loose connection – our network analysis then focussed on close interaction. It was seen as meaningful whether or not a statement on collaboration or contact from one actor (the source) was returned by another (the target). For example, it can be the case that a high number of actors approach one actor, but this actor only recalls a few of them, because he or she (the target) does not attach the same importance to all actors.

Summing up, the network analysis in this research is based on a set of actors which are linked with each other by the directed relation of close interaction. It is a directed graph.

In the following, measures that are used to analyse the structure and characteristics of networks are introduced.

Density

The density of a network is defined as the proportion of arcs (directed links) present. It is calculated as the number of arcs L , divided by the possible number of arcs $n(n-1)$, where n is the number of nodes in the network. In a directed graph (as in our case) the density Δ is:

$$\Delta = L/n(n-1).$$

The density of a network gives an idea of how much interaction takes place between actors within a network. It varies between a value of zero and one; a density value of zero indicates no links between the actors and a value of one the maximum possible links between the actors. In this analysis the density is presented as a percentage value, where 100% would then signify that all actors are interacting with each other reciprocally. The density of a network depends on its size. The fewer actors in a network, the higher the probability is that they will know and interact with each other. In a large network the maximum of 100% is unlikely. However, in our study, the number of actors is relatively small (varying between 13 and 26), so this should not bias the results.

In our case, network density can also be interpreted as a measure for the importance the actors attach to organic farming policy. Actors that are not connected to the network are called isolates. In our case, isolates are actors who did not state that they interacted closely with other actors and with whom no other actor claimed close interaction.

Degree Centrality

Degree centrality C_D is a local network measure of the level of activity of an actor with its immediate neighbours. In a directed graph it is necessary to consider two cases depending on the direction of the arcs between two actors.

The in-degree, d_i , of a node n_i indicates the number of arcs terminating at this node. It describes the number of actors that name this specific actor as a target of direct interaction. Thus, we can interpret it as an indicator of the actor's prestige (degree-prestige). The more other actors from the network name a specific one as target of immediate interaction, the higher its prestige.

The out-degree, d_o , of a node n_i is the number of arcs originating from this node. It informs about the number of actors with which one specific actor states direct interaction and can thus be seen as a measure of how pro-active an actor is in a network.

If an actor's in-degree is much higher than its out-degree we can interpret it as quite passive in the network. It may be a prestigious actor, but does not actively (on its own initiative) participate in the policy process.

For comparison between networks of different size these measures are standardized to C'_D by dividing the absolute values by the possible maximum value of the degree which is $n-1$:

$$C'_D(n_i) = d(n_i)/n-1$$

where d should be read as d_I or d_o , respectively.

Betweenness Centrality

Betweenness centrality C_B is a global network measure of the position of an actor in the context of the whole network, i.e. it describes the potential of an actor for being an information broker in the network and informs about its overall activity level. An actor is central if it lies between other actors on their shortest link (the so-called geodesic), i.e., if these two actors want to interact with each other they have to pass via the central actor. A large betweenness centrality of an actor signifies that it is between many pairs of actors on their geodesics.

Again, this measure is standardized to enable cross network comparison. For a directed graph the standardized measure of betweenness centrality C'_B is:

$$C'_B(n_i) = C_B(n_i)/[(g-1)(g-2)]$$

With $C_B(n_i) = \sum g_{jk}(n_i)/g_{jk}$

where g_{jk} is the number of geodesics linking the two actors j and k.

Reputation

Organizations and institutions are also of importance if they are regarded as important by many other actors. This is called reputational power. It is a more general measure than the betweenness centrality and not a network measure in its strict sense. Reputation in this context is based on the overall assessment of the interviewed actors whereas betweenness centrality results from statements on interaction made by the actors and, hence, is more specific.

In our case, we asked about the reputation of actors for organic farming policy, as well as for general farming policy. The reputational score of an actor is indicated as proportion of interviewees who named this actor as influential for the policy in question.

Cliques

A clique is defined as a completely connected subgroup in a network. In a directed graph, this means that members of a clique mutually interact with each other. In our analysis, a minimum number of 3 actors per clique was prescribed, i.e. a triad.

The number of cliques shows how many subgroups there are that interact with each other closely. Such subgroups can be important in a policy process. It is interesting to look at the actors that are member of more than one clique as they may play an outstanding role for the information flow in a network. Such actors are fairly active in a policy network.

Blockmodelling

Blockmodelling is a way of simplifying structures, e.g. in a network. Actors with a similar relational profile are grouped into one block and the relation between these blocks can then be analysed (Burt 1991; Henning 2000). In our survey we chose not to create blocks according to the network of interaction, but to explore the possible existence of clear blocks of opinions towards organic farming policy. Therefore, the blockmodelling procedure is based on the question “With whom do you share opinions towards organic farming policy and with whom do you have diverging opinions on this issue?”. The aim was to highlight opinion blocks that might be a source of conflict (or cooperation) in the network.

2.3 The comparative approach to national network analysis

The goal of the national level part of our study is twofold. On the one hand, we want to describe and analyse the different organic farming policy networks in a number of European states. On the other hand, we are searching for patterns of organic farming policy making in Europe and therefore need to compare the different networks.

For the comparative strategy applied to compare networks in eleven countries we perceive nations both as units of analysis, and as the context of analysis. A nation is seen as a set of social, economic and political institutions that relate to policy making. The nation is the subject of analysis (explaining specific characteristics) and at the same time it is one element in a bigger system (Knoke 1996). In the case of this project, the challenge for the research lay in the fact that we face different historical-political, socio-economic and cultural backgrounds in each country.

Network interviews were carried out by local researchers and could therefore be conducted in the native language. A common network questionnaire was produced and translated into the native languages. To ensure that the researchers conducting the network interviews in each country had a common understanding of the process, detailed guidelines were developed. As it is crucial to network analysis to identify the appropriate boundaries of a network, these guidelines included a detailed prescription of how to choose the policy actors to be interviewed. We applied a combination of the reputational and positional approaches (Sciarini 1996) to identify potential interviewees. First, invitation lists for parliamentary hearings on issues of organic farming (or any comparable event) were consulted and a list of politically active organizations was produced. Researchers then discussed the list with key persons and identified the most important actors in the domain of organic farming policy. Other actors were added if necessary. The final list also included those institutions that are important in the policy process from an institutional point of view. Overall, in each country a list of about 20 policy actors had to be produced in this way in order to keep the network size in a certain range and thus keep network analysis results comparable, although some of them depend on the size of the

network. In addition, the guidelines contained instructions on how to conduct the interviews and how the information obtained should be recorded. Spread sheets were provided in which the interviewers could record the results in a manner that could be easily processed.

All interviews were carried out in the winter of 2003/04 in order to minimize potential influence from varying external political situations. Interviewees came from state institutions, representing the relevant ministries and/or its departments, as well as from the private sector including general and organic farming organizations, environmental and consumer interest groups, market organizations and supermarket chains and other politically important actors. Interviews took about one hour and focussed on the network question “With whom do you work together or stay in regular contact in order to exchange your views on organic farming policy?” (see Annex 7.1 for the full questionnaire). After conducting the interviews, the national researchers submitted the interview results to the network analyst. A central analysis of the data ensured a common routine of analysis and reduced the possible measurement errors.

Network analysis was carried out with UCINET software (Borgatti et al. 1999). This computer programme can calculate the different network measures described in the previous section of this chapter. Visualization of the policy networks was done with Visone software (Brandes & Wagner 2003), which has a functionality for graphical representation of actor and network characteristics. Netdraw (Borgatti 2002) was used for illustrating the EU level networks. For modelling the blocks of opinion, the software application STRUCTURE (Burt 1991) was used. STRUCTURE bases blockmodelling on hierarchical clustering (based on the Ward algorithm) of the actors and leaves it to the scientist to test the assignments of actors to blocks.

2.4 Qualitative and quantitative approach used for EU level analysis

The research at European level had two aims. First, it was concerned with the network of organic farming policy, i.e. which policy actors are there, how are they connected to one another and what is their relationship with actors from the general farming network? Second, the research aimed at exploring the acceptance of organic farming policy by those who have an influence on it. These two goals were pursued in separate surveys that will be described in the following section.

To address the organic farming policy network, first of all the network boundaries have to be defined. Identifying those actors who play a role in organic farming policy making at the EU level is more complex than at the national level. As argued in chapter 1.2, the structure of policy making is not so straightforward and, in general, one can discern two distinctive ways of policy making: a supra-national path followed by interest groups that are organized on a European level and an international path where member states are the EU level actors. In the latter case, national interest groups try to lobby their national governments on

their decisions and thus indirectly influence EU policy. As regards the CAP, which shapes the framework conditions for organic farming policy, one can notice a large number of diverse interest groups at both EU and national level which are acting on the European stage.

Given the constraints described above for exploring European level policy, we chose a qualitative approach to explore the organic farming policy network. As for the national level, a combination of reputational and positional approach (Sciarini 1996) was chosen to identify the policy actors relevant for the network. The questionnaire for the national policy networks had also included a question on the most important actors at the EU level so we could make use of the judgement of around 200 national actors from eleven countries. Then, the attendee list of the Commission's January 2004 hearing on the "European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming" was used to identify participating organizations. Experts that are knowledgeable about the European organic farming policy were asked to give their opinion on the most important actors for EU organic farming policy. Other actors were included according to their institutionally prescribed roles in policy making. This process resulted in a list of 20 actors to be interviewed on the network for organic farming policy at EU level. After some of them turned out to be unwilling to respond to our request, 17 face-to-face interviews were carried out during autumn 2004. For a full list of actors interviewed, please refer to Annex 7.3. The interviews followed a structured questionnaire including closed and open questions that allowed additional information given by the interviewees. Interviews were tape recorded to facilitate a freer conversation. Due to the limited number of actors that are actively involved in organic farming policy at European level, a full network analysis as undertaken at the national level was not feasible. The results of EU level analysis are presented in chapter 4.

The second aim of the EU level research was to explore the acceptance of organic farming policy. It was aimed at a broader audience and thus conducted in form of a web-based survey. In addition to the actors that had been interviewed about the organic farming policy network, other actors with a potentially high influence on the CAP were included in this survey. In their research, Henning and Wald (2000) categorized a large number of CAP actors at the EU level, also including national interest groups (i.e. farmers' unions) which often run their own offices in Brussels. Organizations and institutions that they had assessed as "important" were included in the list of interviewees. Organizations that had been mentioned as influential during the national or EU network interviews complemented the list to make a total of 138 actors of which 123 were actually surveyed².

² Some e-mails sent showed permanent delivery errors, and three addressees declined to respond as they did not feel they were the right contact person. After deleting these actors from the list, 123 remained.

A web-based questionnaire was developed including mostly closed questions and submitted to the interviewees. After two reminders, the most important actors that had not responded so far were contacted by phone. In some cases, an electronic version of the questionnaire ready to print out was sent and then faxed back by the respondents. This approach achieved a response rate of 35%, i.e. 43 responses.

In the main part of the web-based survey the interviewees were firstly asked to assess if certain policy instruments and strategies would promote organic farming in Europe and secondly, to indicate whether or not they would accept these instruments. Further questions aimed at revealing the policy actors' knowledge about and attitudes towards organic farming. In addition, we asked for their opinions if the introduction of GMO into general agricultural practice had any relevance for organic farming.

The statistical programme SPSS was used for further analysis. Various uni- and bivariate analyses were completed.

3 Organic farming policy networks in eleven European countries

Because (socio-economic) framework conditions vary in the countries surveyed, we expect that different organic farming policy networks have developed throughout Europe. The following comparison of the results of national level³ network analysis aims at verifying this hypothesis. In the eleven countries included in our research (AT, CH, CZ, DE, DK, EE, HU, IT, PL, SI, ENG) interviews with the relevant actors of organic farming policy were conducted during the winter of 2003/04.

3.1 Comparative analysis of the network actors

We start the comparison of organic farming policy networks by focusing on the actors involved in each country. We thereby describe the different types of actors and their attitudes towards organic farming and analyse their reputational power for organic farming policy.

3.1.1 Actors involved in organic farming policy in Europe

Actors included in the survey are those stakeholders that are politically active in organic farming policy. This means that either they are important from an institutional point of view or they are influential interest groups. To avoid overestimation of those actors that are primarily focussing on organic farming issues, researchers in the eleven countries also considered policy actors relevant to general farming policy making.

On average (the figure presented is the median⁴), the number of actors belonging to a national organic farming policy network in the countries studied is 17. The number varies between 13 in the Czech Republic and 26 actors in Austria which were estimated as influential on organic farming policy making. Relatively small networks (below average size) are found in the CZ, EE and IT, networks of medium size are found in HU, PL and SI whereas we find larger networks in AT, CH, DK, DE and ENG. The networks contain state institutions, non-governmental organizations (interest groups) and other private or parastatal⁵ organizations. The following chart (Figure 3-1) shows the share of each actor type in the countries.


³ In some countries, in particular in DE and IT, the regional level plays an important role in agricultural policy making and networks of organic farming might have developed at this level. All the same, due to resource constraints it was not possible to include this level in our research. The results presented here focus on the national level, admitting that this shows only part of the reality of the organic farming policy structure in countries, such as DE and IT.

⁴ The median is used here, as outlier values would increase the mean so that this measure would not reflect where the majority of data points lie.

⁵ An organization owned or controlled wholly or partly by the government.

Private organizations included organic and general farming organizations, as well as environmental and consumers' interest groups, retailers and their organizations or private research institutes. The state is represented by the ministry in charge of agriculture⁶ (and often here, the department for organic farming), and in some countries by the ministry of environment and different subordinated administrative bodies. Other actors include e.g. political parties and parastatal institutions.

Figure 3-1: Types of actors in the organic farming policy networks




Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

During the interviews, the interviewees were asked to classify their institution or organization in one of three groups according to their main policy orientation: predominantly oriented towards mainstream agriculture, predominantly oriented towards organic farming, or undefined or balanced, respectively, with regard to the two different farming systems. National experts on organic farming policy verified the self-assessment or revised the classification as appropriate. In the study countries, the share of each group in the organic farming policy network varies quite substantially, as can be seen from Figure 3-2.

⁶ In the following, it is referred to as “agricultural ministry” even though, in different countries, this name might not be fully accurate.

Figure 3-2: Orientation of organic farming policy network actors towards farming systems



Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

Interestingly, in Denmark there are no actors that were classified as oriented predominantly towards mainstream farming. It is assumed that all Danish actors have a common understanding of organic farming and its importance in the agricultural policy domain. In all countries except for Hungary, actors oriented towards organic farming make up the minority of all actors involved in organic farming policy making. In six out of eleven countries (CH, AT, EE, ENG, PL, SI) the number of “mainstream” actors exceeds the number of “organic” actors.

This simple description of actors illustrates the structural environment of the organic farming policy networks in these countries. It does not, however, tell much about the power and influence of the different actors or groups of actors in the network. The various measures of power and network characteristics which have been introduced in the methodology chapter and are presented below are more meaningful.

.1.2 Reputational power of organic farming policy actors

- 3 Interviewees were asked to indicate those organizations or institutions that they found the most influential for organic and general farming policy. The number of interviewees naming one specific actor is an indicator for the power of the named actor. First, we present the most powerful actors for organic farming policy before contrasting them with those that were named as influential for general farming policy. Table 3-1 shows the most powerful actors in each country. A full list of reputational power of actors in each country can be found in Annex 7.2.

Table 3-1: Reputational power for organic farming policy*

Country	Type of actor				
	Ministry/ department in charge of organic farming	Organic farming organization	General farming organization	Other state institutions	Other types of actors
Austria	100%	88%	23%	4 – 19%	0 – 42%
Denmark	76%	88%	35%	6 – 82%	0 – 35%
Switzerland	73%	95%	23%	0%	0 – 73%
Germany	93%	82%	36%	4 – 46%	0 – 64%
Italy	56%	63%	50%	31%	0 – 19%
England	95%	95%	25%	0 – 20%	0 – 25%
Czech Republic	100%	100%	0%	85%	0 – 92%
Estonia	93%	87%	7%	0 – 47%	0 – 80%
Hungary	59%	82%	6%	0 – 41%	0 – 59%
Poland	94%	47%	18%	18 – 41%	6 – 18%
Slovenia	76%	94%	6%	0 – 18%	0 – 71%
Median over all countries	93%	88%	23%	not calculated	not calculated

*indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming a specific actor as one of the five most important for organic farming policy

Source: own data (based on national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

Table 3-1 presents the share of interviewees that named a specific actor as one of the five most important for organic farming policy in their country. If more than one actor belongs to the actor type (indicated in the column headings), we only give the reputational score of the highest-scoring actor within this type. Our main focus lies on the role of the state and the organic and general farming organizations. To complete the picture of the power distribution in the countries, the last two columns show the range of scores for other actor types. When interpreting the table, only scores above 50% for one actor indicate a reasonable level of power in organic farming policy (Kriesi 1980). The last row shows the median of all country scores.

In all countries, the agricultural ministry is one of the most powerful policy actors for organic farming policy, which is not surprising given its institutional role. Together with (at least one) organic farming organization it dominates this policy field. General farming organizations, in general, do not enjoy a very high reputation for organic farming policy in any of the countries. An exception is Italy where power is equally distributed over the different types of actors. In part, the federal organization of the state is responsible for this relatively low power of the national Italian agricultural ministry; decisions are taken in

constant negotiations between the national and the regional ministries. When looking at Poland, one notices the extraordinary low value for the organic farming organization. The agricultural ministry plays an overriding role for organic farming policy making or, seen from another angle, organic farming organizations so far have not developed a significant influence in the policy-making process. As far as the new member states are concerned, the reputation of general farming organizations for organic farming policy is below the European median in all of these countries whereas it is equal to or above the median value in all old EU member states and Switzerland.

From the last two columns we can see that in seven countries other organizations and institutions than those discussed above are influencing organic farming policy (for details please refer to Annex 7.2). In Denmark the Standing Committee on Food, Agriculture and Fisheries of the Parliament (FUD) is of particular importance with a score for its reputational power of 82%. In addition, the Organic Food Council (OFC) has some influence, with a score of 53%. The OFC is an advisory committee to the agricultural minister on organic farming matters and comprises a wide range of interests in agriculture and food production. Overall, three state actors have an important influence on organic farming policy in Denmark. In Switzerland we find one of the two big retailer chains, COOP, in a powerful position for organic farming policy making (reaching a score of 73%). This highlights the importance of the market players for organic farming in this country. Furthermore, some power is attached to FIBL – the Research Institute of Organic Agriculture (59%). Interviewees in Germany reported the Green party as an influential actor in organic farming policy (64%), since it was responsible for the German agricultural ministry during the survey period. In the Czech Republic most of the actors named the inspection organization KEZ as one of the most important actors for organic farming policy (92%). KEZ works closely with the organic farming organization PRO-BIO and was an important partner for the latter during the elaboration of the Czech Action Plan for Organic Farming. Also the environmental ministry was engaged in the development of this action plan, which is reflected by its strong position for organic farming policy making (85%). In Estonia a high share of interviewees found that the Centre for Ecological Engineering (CEET) was very important for organic farming policy (80%). The CEET not only has been very active in training and advice, but also maintained contact with the agricultural ministry so that it is well recognized all over the organic farming policy sector (Moschitz et al. 2004). The fairly high reputation in Hungary of the certification body Biokontrol (59%) is expected due to the orientation of the Hungarian organic farming sector to their export market (Moschitz et al. 2004). This requires a well established certification system and places the certification organization in a powerful position. In Slovenia, the top ranked “other type of actor” is the Chamber of Agriculture (71%) which is powerful in agricultural policy for institutional reasons.

We will now turn to the reputational power of actors for general farming policy shown in Table 3-2. A full record of reputational power for general

farming policy is given in Annex 7.2. For interpretation of the figures, please see the explanations for Table 3-1.

Table 3-2: Reputational power for general farming policy*

Country	Type of actor				
	Ministry/ department in charge of organic farming	Organic farming organization	General farming organization	Other state institutions	Other types of actors
Austria	100%	8%	92%	8%	0 – 92%
Denmark	100%	12%	65%	0 – 82%	0 – 88%
Switzerland	95%	14%	95%	0%	5 – 64%
Germany	96%	11%	100%	0 – 64%	0 – 75%
Italy	69%	0%	100%	0%	0 – 94%
England	95%	5%	70%	5 – 65%	0 – 15%
Czech Republic	100%	0%	100%	15%	0 – 69%
Estonia	93%	0%	73%	0 – 27%	0 – 73%
Hungary	82%	12%	59%	0 – 12%	0 – 6%
Poland	94%	12%	24%	12 – 59%	6 – 29%
Slovenia	88%	6%	41%	0 – 35%	0 – 82%
Median over all countries	95%	8%	73%	not calculated	not calculated

*indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming a specific actor as one of the five most important for general farming policy

Source: own data (based on national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

As for organic farming policy, the agricultural ministry is the most powerful actor for general farming policy (except in Italy). In most of the countries, at least one general farming organization holds a fair amount of power in the agricultural policy-making process whereas organic farming organizations play a marginal role. Interestingly, in Poland and Slovenia the general farming organizations are not assigned a high reputation for influencing policy. In Italy, the ministry is reported to have some power, but all three national farmers' unions are more influential. As argued before, the federal nature of the state is partly responsible for this relatively low power of the national agricultural ministry. Additional actors exert power in the general farming policy network. However, they will not be discussed here as our focus lies on the role of organic farming organizations.

3.2 Comparative analysis of organic farming policy networks

The comparison of organic farming policy networks focuses on the density of networks and the centrality measures for the different network actors.

3.2.1 Density and size of organic farming policy networks in Europe

The network density indicates how much interaction takes place in a network and is thus one of the basic features to describe a (organic farming) policy network. Table 3-3 shows the country values in order of increasing density.

Table 3-3: The density of organic farming policy networks in Europe

Country	Density
Estonia	7.9%
Slovenia	9.6%
Switzerland	11.7%
Hungary	15.8%
Czech Republic	17.3%
Poland	17.7%
Italy	21.7%
Germany	23.9%
Austria	24.9%
England	31.1%
Denmark	45.6%
Median over all countries	17.7%

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04) based on results of network analysis with UCINET software

The median value for the studied countries is a density of 17.7%, i.e. typically, less than one fifth of all possible links between network actors is established. However, there is a wide range of densities between the different countries starting from 7.9% in Estonia to 45.6% in Denmark. New EU member states all have a below average or average network density. From the other countries, only in Switzerland is the network below average density. In all the old EU member states, the density is above the median.

The following Table 3-4 explores the relation between size and density of the surveyed networks. The countries are classified into loose, average and dense on the density scale, and small, average and large in relation to the median size of all networks.

Table 3-4: Size and density of organic farming policy networks in Europe

Size	Density		
	Loose	Average	Dense
Small	EE	CZ	IT
Average	SI, HU	PL	
Large	CH		DK, ENG, DE, AT

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04) based on results of network analysis with UCINET software

Table 3-4 shows that the size of the network does not limit the interaction between actors. The total number of actors in the networks analysed is small enough to allow for contacts between all of them individually. Size did not influence the density of the networks. The new EU member states are all situated in the upper left part of the table, signifying rather small and loose networks. Most of the other countries show large and dense networks of organic farming policy. Exceptions are IT with a small and dense network, and CH where the network is large but loose. To sum up, in those countries where the organic sector is more established (as described by Moschitz et al. 2004) there are more actors involved in organic farming policy making and these actors are more closely connected to each other than in countries where the sector is still developing.

3.2.2 Centrality of actors in the organic farming policy network

Table 3-5 shows for each country what type of actor is in the most central position in the organic farming policy network. The betweenness centrality measure is applied here as an indicator for the overall level of activity of an actor in a network. Actors are differentiated according to type and attitude towards organic farming: predominantly oriented towards organic farming, predominantly oriented towards mainstream farming and a third category of actors which do not have a clear position towards one or the other form of land management, or which have equal regard for both.

In six out of the eleven countries (CH, CZ, DK, AT, DE, IT), organic farming organizations take the central position in the network. They are the most active in the network context and have the highest potential to control and broker the flow of information. In DE, the central position is taken by two organic farming organizations that are nearly equally important for the network. In AT, DE and IT, there are other actors that share the central position with them. The presence of the other actors restricts the power of each individual central actor; the network is not dominated by one organization or institution. In two cases (DE and IT) this second central actor takes a balanced position on the organic versus mainstream scale so that, overall, the influence of the organic farming organizations is still considerable (assuming that “balanced” actors are equally open to organic farming issues). In AT, the mainstream oriented

ministry limits the political influence of the organic farming organization, and conflict between these actors has been reported.

Table 3-5: Central actor types in organic farming policy networks in Europe

Most central type of actor	Countries
Organic farming organization	CH, CZ, DK, AT*, DE*, IT**
Ministry, predominantly mainstream oriented	AT*, ENG
Ministry, undefined / balanced	HU, DE*, SI*
Other state or parastatal actors, predominantly mainstream oriented	EE, PL, SI*
Other parastatal actors, undefined / balanced	IT**

* two actors in the centre

** no actor precisely in the centre, but two actors close to the centre

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04) based on results of network analysis with UCINET software


Altogether, the agricultural ministries play a central role in five national networks (AT, ENG, HU, DE, SI). This institution is classified as principally oriented towards mainstream farming in AT and ENG, and as balanced in the other three countries. In SI, the central position of the ministry is joined by a parastatal institution, the agricultural chamber, which is oriented towards mainstream farming. Thus, organic farming policy in this country is highly influenced by non-organic actors.

In EE and PL other institutions oriented towards mainstream agriculture play an important role in organic farming policy. However, the size and density of the Estonian network are so small that it is difficult to interpret network analysis figures. In PL, the most central actor is the agricultural chamber that is said to be the only general farming organization that is interested in organic farming. Organic farming organizations remain in the periphery and do not play an important role in this network, thus confirming the results of the analysis of the actors' reputation.

Among other issues, this study is particularly interested in the role of organic farming organizations in the policy-making process. As seen in Table 3-5 the countries studied vary with respect to the type of organization that takes the central role in the network. To further explore the different roles that organic farming organizations and the agricultural ministries, the two scores for betweenness centrality were mapped. Figure 3-3 displays the betweenness centrality scores of the

agricultural ministry and those of the most central organic farming organization.

Figure 3-3: Centrality of agricultural ministries and organic farming organizations in European organic farming policy networks



Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04) based on results of network analysis with UCINET software

Most of the actors can be grouped according to the different roles of the organic farming organizations and the ministry. In Figure 3-3 we find four different types of networks based on the roles of organic farming organizations and the agricultural ministry. The lower right quadrant contains networks in which organic farming organizations are dominant whereas the ministry plays a relatively minor role or none at all. The upper left quadrant groups networks in which the ministry dominates the network and organic farming organizations are more in the periphery. In countries of the upper right quadrant the most central position is taken by both types of actors – the ministry and (at least one) organic farming organization prevent the other from dominating the network. In the cases of EE and PL where a third party holds the most central position in the network the mapping illustrates that neither the organic farming organizations nor the ministry plays a significant role.

Countries can be grouped into two main clusters according to the role of the organic farming organization. In most of the new member states studied, these organizations do not play the dominant role in the network. In the other countries the organic farming organizations are actively involved in policy making. In AT, DE and IT organic farming organizations hold the highest value of betweenness centrality, with the ministry having a relatively high value of betweenness centrality. In these countries state and private actors are of similar importance for organic farming policy. We can also group ENG into this group of highly

important organic farming organizations, but the ministry is dominant here. This dominance of the agricultural ministry is clear in SI where the organic farming organization is found in the periphery of the policy network. In the CZ, DK and CH the ministry is of minor importance for organic farming policy. Its activity is limited and it remains passive whereas organic farming organizations have a relatively higher importance.

3.3 Relationship between the organic farming and general farming domain

Organic farming policy is a sub-domain of agricultural policy. Organic farming development is thus also influenced by decisions taken on this level. So what does network analysis tell us about the relationship between the mainstream and the organic farming sector?

First, we look at the different scores for reputational power. Summarising Table 3-1 and Table 3-2, we can see that organic farming organizations are powerful only for organic farming policy, whereas general farming organizations influence both policy fields at least to some extent. The agricultural ministries are important for both of the policy fields, which is easily explained by their institutional role in the political system. Table 3-6 presents an overview of the average reputational power of organic farming and mainstream organizations.

Table 3-6: *Comparison of reputational power of different actor types for general and organic farming policy (indicated by the share of interviewees naming a specific actor as one of the five most important in this policy domain)*

Policy field	Ministry/department in charge of organic farming	Organic farming organization	General farming organization
Organic farming policy	93%	88%	23%
General farming policy	95%	8%	73%

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

From a cross-country perspective, we observed a relatively weak position for organic farming in the general agricultural policy domain. Although general farming organizations are not too powerful in the organic farming policy domain, they do exert more influence than organic farming organizations in the general farming policy domain. Interviewees in all countries clearly distinguish between the two policy domains and assign different power structures to them. If power is unequally distributed this may cause conflict between actors which will be discussed below.

To reveal different opinions on organic farming policy a blockmodelling procedure was applied. The idea behind blockmodelling is to simplify network structures by grouping those actors together that show a similar structure of relations (Burt 1991; Henning 2000). Blocks were created based on the different opinions of actors about organic farming policy. The interviewees were asked to state with which actors they shared the same opinion on organic farming policy and with which they did not. In this way, it was aimed at finding clearly distinguishable camps (in a political sense) with regard to organic farming that could be described on the basis of the network characteristics of the actors involved.⁷

In countries with a relatively strong position of the organic sector (except for Italy), or dense networks, a number of blocks were identified. In AT, CH, DK, DE, ENG and CZ different groups of opinion exist with regards to organic farming policy that can form a basis for debate about this policy issue. Although the structure of conflict remained vague, in these countries, a block containing the most important actors from the organic sector could be distinguished from a block of mostly mainstream actors. In addition, other blocks were identified, such as environmental organizations or other organizations with a broader focus than agriculture.

In all these cases, the “organic” blocks contained centrally in the network located organic sector organizations. This means that these blocks are also the most active in the network of organic farming policy. Opposing actors play a peripheral role in the networks and are not very active. Therefore, even though conflicts might exist between different actors, these conflicts are currently not conducted through a political debate in which all parties take part. Actors critical towards organic farming are not engaged in organic farming policy making. The structure of conflict does not meet the structure of activity. An exception is Austria, where three blocks are polarising the network actors. The organic farming organizations, the agricultural ministry and a parastatal institution publicly agree and disagree on organic farming policy issues. All these actors occupy a central position in the network. One reason for this apparent conflict is that, at the time of the interviews, there was an ongoing debate on the development of the organic sector including the merger of the three large organic farming organizations to form one umbrella organization. The Austrian blockmodelling results also support the statement that the organic sector in this country is still fighting for full recognition (Moschitz et al. 2004).

In countries where the network of organic farming policy is loose and organic farming organizations do not play a central role (EE, HU, PL and SI), the blockmodelling approach did not identify any blocks that could be soundly explained. National experts commented that policy actors are not interested in organic farming. Therefore, they do not have an opinion

⁷ The straightforward question about whether an actor agrees or disagrees on organic farming policy can be biased when actors hesitate to state their disagreements in front of a third person - the interviewer. Keeping this in mind, the results presented here should be interpreted with some caution. Nevertheless, we think that the results can contribute to the overall picture of the political situation of organic farming in Europe, although blockmodelling did not lead to clear results in all countries.

about organic farming policy issues and they often do not know who are the stakeholders involved – indifference or ignorance is the reason unclear political opinions. In IT, the blockmodelling approach did not produce a clear opinion structure either. In this case, it is more difficult to explain such a result and a more detailed investigation would be needed, but this is beyond the scope of this study.

From the blockmodelling results we can conclude that, currently, organic farming policy is not an actively debated policy issue in any of the countries studied. Either most of the agricultural policy makers are indifferent towards this issue or opinions are clear and are not to be debated.

3.4 Main findings from the comparative analysis of European organic farming policy networks

The composition of organic farming policy networks in Europe varies from country to country in regard to the distribution of different actor type shares (state, private or parastatal). However, in most of the countries, excluding PL and SI, the majority of actors are private organizations. Concerning the actors' attitude, only a minority of actors is considered as predominantly oriented towards organic farming in all countries except HU.

Due to its institutional role it is not surprising that in all countries the agricultural ministry is one of the most powerful policy actors in organic farming in terms of reputational power. Also organic farming organizations enjoy a high reputation in all countries excluding PL, whereas general farming organizations are not very powerful in organic farming policy (with the exception of IT).

The comparative analysis showed that the different frameworks of old and new EU member states have an impact on the organic farming policy networks. The organic sector is younger in the new member states and policy networks are not as well established as in the old member states where networks are larger and denser. This agrees with conclusions from the survey of the institutional development of organic farming completed by Moschitz et al. (2004). For the old EU member states, Moschitz et al. (2004) stated a broader acceptance of organic farming by the different stakeholder groups, as well as a developed market (i.e. market actors become involved in shaping the organic farming sector).

Regarding betweenness centrality as a measure for the overall activity of an actor, the analysis revealed that in all old EU member states, in CH and in CZ organic farming organizations play the most central role in organic farming policy networks. This dominant role is shared with the agricultural ministry in ENG, AT, DE and IT. By contrast, in SI the agricultural ministry is alone in the centre. In EE, HU and PL other actors are central in the organic farming policy network whereas organic farming organizations and ministries play a less important role.

In all countries analysed, organic farming organizations lack reputational power with regard to general farming policy. The organic and the general farming domains are still clearly separated from each other. Currently, organic farming is not an issue of debate on the countries' political agenda.

4 The structure and acceptance of organic farming policy at the level of the European Union

Organic farming policy at the EU level is embedded in the policy framework of organic farming as presented in chapter 1.2.2. This chapter presents the relevant actors involved in the policy process, their attitudes and policy preferences, as well as the network of the most engaged organic farming policy actors. Both direct policy making at the EU level and indirectly via the nation level are considered. These findings are based on a research addressing EU institutions and interest groups working at the EU level, as well as national institutions and interest groups representing national interests. In chapter 4.1 we characterize the actors involved in organic farming policy and discuss their knowledge about and attitude to organic farming. In chapter 4.2 we will take a network perspective for analysing the interrelations between them. Chapter 4.3 focuses on the contents of policy and presents possible strategies and instruments of organic farming policy that have been tested for their acceptance by the actors involved.

4.1 Description of actors involved in European organic farming policy making

The description of actors involved in organic farming policy at the European level focuses on those actors that responded to a web-based survey aiming at exploring the level of acceptance of different policy instruments (see chapter 2.4). On the basis of these 43 responses (a response rate of 35%), actors are characterized. First, we describe characteristics such as working level, type of organization and time span of their activity at the EU level. Secondly, we present their political attitude towards organic farming and related issues. These attitudinal features comprise the actors' perception and knowledge of organic farming, as well as their position towards the introduction of GMO into general agricultural practice. Both characterizations will be used in the further chapters to describe and analyse the policy networks and the acceptance of organic farming policy instruments and strategies.

4.1.1 Characteristics of the actors involved in European organic farming policy making

Table 4-1 shows that about 60% (26) of the respondents to the web survey are actors at the EU level against 40% (17) are national level organizations and institutions.

Table 4-1: Overview of the response rates in the different actor categories addressed in the web-based survey⁸

	Number of questionnaires sent out	Number of responses	Response rate
EU level total	79	26	33%
EU Commission	18	8	44%
EU Parliament	7	0	0%
Farmers' interest group	4	2	50%
Organic farming organization	2	1	50%
Agri-industry organization	10	2	20%
Commercial organization	9	1	11%
Labour union	2	1	50%
Consumer interest group	3	1	33%
Environmental interest group	10	5	50%
Others	14	5	36%
National level total	44	17	39%
Permanent representation	20	10	50%
National farmers' interest group	18	5	28%
National organic farming organization	5	2	40%
Others	1	0	0%
Total	123	43	35%

Source: own data (EU-level web-based survey, spring 2005)

Strikingly, the share of national institutions which answered the web-based survey is relatively higher than one might expect from the distribution of actors addressed. In fact, 50% of the permanent representations of the EU member states contacted responded to the survey (AT, CZ, DK, EE, HU, LU, SE, SI, SK, UK). Indeed, national representations make up the largest group of respondents. They are followed by different institutions of the European Commission (8). None of the addressed parties of the European Parliament responded to the survey. By contrast, the group of farmers' unions is present with a considerable number of respondents (altogether 7), and a fairly high number of national farmers' interest groups answered (5). At the EU level, several environmental groups participated in the web-based survey of organic farming policy (5), while other types of organizations such as

⁸ When interpreting the figures one has to consider that some institutions and organizations that were foreseen for the survey had to be withdrawn due to permanent delivery failures of the e-mails that could not be resolved. Therefore, for example, although there are 25 permanent representations of EU member states at Brussels, only 20 were finally included in the survey. As to the national farmers' unions, only those which run their own offices in Brussels were considered, which reduced the number of national farmers' interest groups to 18.

groups representing consumers' interests and the agri-industry responded to a smaller extent.

The figures should be treated with some caution. The total number of organizations in each actor type is not equal for all the types, e.g. consumers' interests are represented by two organizations at the EU level whereas many more agri-industry organizations exist. Only one organic farming organization is relevant at the EU level (IFOAM EU).

The return rate of questionnaires in a written survey depends on whether the interviewee's attention could be attracted by the topic in question, the number and type of contacts, the length of the questionnaire, the way in which the interviewee is addressed, the institution that is conducting the survey, incentives given and confidentiality granted (Hippler 1988). In our case, no incentives were given to the addressees of the survey. However, the means of communicating with them by e-mail and providing a web-based questionnaire is common in the European policy environment. Furthermore, the policy actors were reminded twice about responding. Thus, the main factors influencing the return rate are likely to be the time constraints and their interest in the topic of organic farming. Consequently, we can interpret the number of organizations and institutions that filled in the online questionnaire as an indication of their interest in organic farming policy, as well as their (time) resources available. Seen from this angle, we suggest that permanent representations of the member states are an important group of actors interested in the policy process. The European Commission with its various Directorates-General (DG) is highly interested, as well. From the side of interest groups, the farmers' unions showed their interest at both the EU and the national level, and environmental groups are involved to some extent at the EU level. The sole organic farming organization at the EU level is not supported to the same extent by its national counterparts as the European farmers' union (COPA); this is due to the lack of national (organic farming) representations in Brussels. Moreover, organic farming organizations are generally smaller than general farming organizations (altogether they represent about 2% of farmers in the EU while the great majority of farmers is member of a general farming organization) and thus do not have the same resources to respond to surveys.

European farmers' interest groups and those representing closely connected issues such as agri-industry and consumers' interests have a fairly long tradition of lobbying at the EU. In fact, all these groups have been active since the very beginning of the European Community, that is the late 1950s to early 1960s. Recently, more and more national farmers' unions (in particular those of the new EU member states) have set up offices in Brussels to enhance lobbying for their case at the Community level. In contrast, environmental interest groups did not become active until the mid 1970s, and only to a significant extent in the late 1990s (European Commission 2004b). Lobby groups for organic farming only began to operate at the EU level in 1990 (by that time, this was being done by some national organizations) and the IFOAM EU Group was only instituted in 2000, with its own Brussels office from 2003 onward –

although it had previously existed in some other form throughout the 1990s as it continuously engaged with the EU regulation. We can thus observe a relatively young group of organizations lobbying for environmental issues and an even younger organic farming scene, both meeting an interest-group structure (of farmers and consumers) that can look back on a long tradition of policy lobbying.

4.1.2 Attitudes towards organic farming of the actors involved in European organic farming policy making

From the point of view of a further development of organic farming it is particularly interesting which actors support organic farming and which do not. To describe the policy actors' attitudes to organic farming, a scale of organic farming support was developed on which the actors could then be placed according to a support index calculated for each of them.⁹ Table 4-2 shows which items were used to develop the scale of organic farming support.

Table 4-2: Measurement for the organic farming support index

Items on the scale	Item-to-total correlation
Positive statements about organic farming	
Increase in biodiversity	0.79
Groundwater protection	0.70
Contribution to animal welfare	0.74
Reduction of energy use	0.67
Increase in food quality	0.87
Contribution to public health	0.88
No problem for food security	0.71
Role of organic farming in the CAP	0.79

Cronbach coefficient $\alpha = 0.93$

Source: own data (EU-level web-based survey, spring 2005)

The single support index for each actor was calculated as the average score of the eight items used to create the scale. The values ranged from one to four with one indicating the most reserved attitude and four the most positive attitude to organic farming. When placing the policy actors on the scale of support according to their support index one can observe that while there seems to be a bias in the direction of a positive attitude

⁹ The calculation was done by a reliability analysis (Cronbach 1951). Nine items directly linked to attitudes towards organic farming were included in the questionnaire and accompanied by two statements on the importance of organic farming for the respondent's own organization or institution and the CAP in general. Reliability analysis reduced this total of eleven items to a number of seven attitude items and one concerning the role of organic farming for the CAP. The Cronbach coefficient α was used to estimate the construct reliability of the scale.

towards organic farming, the whole span of possible scores is taken. This bias is explainable by the fact that addressees of the questionnaire who are more open to organic farming will probably have responded more frequently. Those who do not have an interest in organic farming or have a more negative attitude towards it, in many cases, will not have responded to the web-based survey.

To make the support index more tangible we have singled out four regions on the scale (A to D) each assembling a number of actors. These regions were defined in parallel to the choices the interviewees had for stating their attitude towards organic farming. Two positive and two negative options were given. A score of two indicates that an interviewee gave negative statements about all items relating to organic farming whereas a score above three indicates that the actor was positive about all items. The category “positive” was subdivided into two regions (A and B) in order to distinguish those actors that made the most positive statements for all or nearly all organic farming items from those who were critical about at least some of them. The “negative” category was subdivided in a group of interviewees that are clearly critical about organic farming and a group that might still see some positive points about organic farming. Table 4-3 describes these “regions” and shows how actors are assigned to them.

Table 4-3: Positions on the scale of organic farming support

Position on the support scale	Organic farming support index
A Organic farming supporters CPE, PR CZ, SA, ECOVAST, EPHA, FIAO, PR AT, PR HU, BIRDLIFE, IFOAM EU, PR SK, EEA, AGRI.F.4, CZ-CZAC, EuroCoop	3.5 – 4.0
B Open to organic farming EEB, AGRI.F.3, EFFAT, Eurogroup, PR LU, PR SI, EURO-TOQUES, BE-BB, LV-LZF, AER, AGRI.C.2, IUCN, JRC.D.8, PR DK, AGRI.A.1, AGRI.H.1, SE-LRF	3.0 – 3.4
C Hesitant about organic farming Euromontana, PR EE, FVE, PR UK, PR SE	> 2.0 – 2.9
D Critical to organic farming TRADE.G.3, UK-NFU, FEFAC, TRADE.G.2, CELCAA	1.0 – 2.0

Source: own data (EU-level web-based survey, spring 2005)

The grouping of the organizations and institutions to one of the positions on the support scale illustrates the current position at the time of the survey (summer 2005) and cannot be taken as a fixed classification of the actors. Some actors might have answered in a strategic way so the index calculated cannot be translated directly into a measurement of observed action for organic farming. It is, nevertheless, an assessment of the actors’ potential to become involved in organic farming policy. The European farmers’ union COPA could not position itself towards organic

farming at all and thus the most powerful agricultural interest group cannot be placed on the scale of organic farming support.

A test for whether the attitude towards organic farming has any influence on the knowledge of EU regulations concerning organic farming policy gave a negative result. No significant correlation is observed between the organic farming support index and knowledge about the Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 or the EU Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming. The degree to which respondents know about the European CAP (represented here by the Luxembourg Agreement of June 2003 and the new Rural Development Regulation) similarly does not correlate significantly with their attitude towards organic farming.

Nevertheless, there is a correlation between the actors' knowledge of the documents regarding organic farming and between those regarding the CAP in general. Knowledge about the Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 regulation correlates strongly with the actors' knowledge about the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming (Spearman-Rho: 0.73) and knowledge about the Luxembourg Agreements correlates moderately with knowledge about the Rural Development Regulation (Spearman-Rho: 0.66). Both correlations are highly significant. Table 4-4 groups the actors according to their knowledge of organic and general farming regulations.

Both national organic farming organizations (the British Soil Association, SA, and the Federation of Italian Organic Agriculture, FIAO) have a good insight into organic farming policy but lack knowledge of the general farming policy framework, whereas IFOAM EU as the EU organic farming representative has a good knowledge of both policy fields. This is also the case for COPA. Interestingly, the environmental groups all state to have a fairly good knowledge about the CAP in general, but lack knowledge about organic farming regulations or the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming. As regards the knowledge of the European Commission's Directorate-General of Agriculture (DG AGRI), we find a high knowledge of general farming legislation whereas knowledge about the organic farming policy framework varies. Those units in charge of horizontal aspects of rural development (AGRI.F) and legislation (AGRI.H) know more about this specific regulatory framework than other units of this Directorate-General. DG TRADE representatives are less familiar with the CAP legislation.

Table 4-4: Actors' knowledge of organic and general farming legislation


		Knowledge of organic farming policy	
		Low	High
Knowledge of general farming policy	Low	CZ-CZAC EPHA EURO-TOQUES EUROCOOP Euromontana FEFAC FVE IUCN JRC.D.8 PR EE TRADE.G.3	FIAO PR CZ PR DK PR LU PR SI PR SK PR UK SE-LRF SA TRADE.G.2
	High	AER AGRI.A.1 AGRI.C.2 BIRDLIFE CPE ECOVAST EEA EEB Eurogroup LV-LZF	AGRI.F.3 AGRI.F.4 AGRI.H.1 BE-BB CELCAA COPA EFFAT IFOAM EU PR AT PR HU PR SE UK-NFU

Source: own data (EU-level web-based survey, spring 2005)

One could argue that with the Regulations (EEC) No 2092/91 and No 2078/92, as well as with the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming organic farming is now well anchored in European legislation. In view of the further development of organic farming policy we are interested in how policy actors perceive the future of organic farming. Figure 4-1 indicates immediate challenges for organic farming as identified by the respondents.

Most of the interviewees named the further development of the organic food market as one of the most important challenges organic farming has to accept in the coming years. The question of co-existence of agriculture using GMO and maintaining GMO-free status is another major challenge, followed closely by the need to further harmonize organic standards. Trade liberalization and declining farm income are not seen as major challenges for organic farming.

Figure 4-1: Respondents' assessment of the most important challenges for organic farming in the EU in the next 3-5 years



Source: own data (EU-level web-based survey, spring 2005)

4.1.3 Summarising the description of EU organic farming policy actors

Permanent representations of the member states, as well as various units of Directorates-General AGRI and TRADE are strongly represented in our survey. Farmers' unions took part both from the EU and the national level whereas only EU level environmental groups responded to the questionnaire. Organic farming organizations are represented by the one EU-level and two national organizations. The two latter groups of organizations appeared only recently (in the late 1990s) at the EU level, where they encountered an interest-group structure of farmers' and consumers' organizations with a long tradition of policy lobbying.

The interviewed actors were grouped into four groups according to their attitudes to organic farming. Organic farming organizations are placed in the group of "organic farming supporters", together with a few environmental organizations. However, most of the environmental organizations are member of the second group which is denominated as "open to organic farming". The majority of DG AGRI units are also placed here. By contrast, DG TRADE units are assigned to the group of actors that are critical towards organic farming – a group also comprising representatives of the agro-industry and a national farmers' union.

This attitude, nevertheless, does not influence the knowledge of the actors about the organic or general farming policy. Organic farming organizations have a high knowledge about organic farming policy, but are less familiar with general farming policy. The opposite holds true for environmental organizations which are more knowledgeable on general

farming policy issues than on issues of organic farming policy. While both IFOAM EU and COPA have a high level of knowledge in both policy fields, the different DGs and their units are split. DG Trade units are less familiar with general farming policy than DG AGRI units. Within DG AGRI, only those units dealing with horizontal aspects of rural development and legislation are highly acquainted with organic farming policy.

Policy actors feel that organic farming has to address internal development (market development, harmonization of standards) rather than trends in general agricultural policy. The most important external factor that organic farming has to address is the introduction of GMOs into agricultural practice. Although a majority of stakeholders (31) fear a negative influence on organic farming from the implementation of this new technology, this view is not undisputed. Some interviewees (6) expect a positive influence, and about the same number (5) think that this would have no effect on organic farming. Thus, further debate on this issue can be expected in future.

4.2 Interrelations between actors involved in European organic farming policy making

The EU polity provides a structure of consultative bodies as a formal means of interest group–institution interaction which has already been described in chapter 1.2. This section first takes a closer look at that formal structure of the EU agricultural policy network and then analyses the observed (more informal) relationships between interest groups and institutions with reference to specific policy processes. The analysis of these informal relationships is based on 17 face-to-face interviews conducted during autumn 2004 whereas the analysis of the formal interrelations is done by investigating EU documents.

4.2.1 Formal network: (co-)membership in Advisory Groups of the Directorate-General Agriculture

We have already described in chapter 1.2 that 117 interest groups are registered at the EU for participating in one or more of the total of 31 consultative bodies on agricultural policy. It has been shown that COPA is by far the best represented interest group in these committees, but some environmental and consumers' groups are also found in a number of different Advisory Groups.

Our interest now lies in the interaction between interest groups. We consider co-membership in one or more consultative bodies as a possibility of meeting and exchanging information and opinions and an actor participating in different Advisory Groups is able to transmit information between groups and between the different group members. From this perspective, information can flow from one actor to another even though they are not meeting directly in an Advisory Group – a third

actor can play the role of an information broker. The network analytical concept of betweenness centrality provides a tool to measure the degree to which particular interest groups play this role. The results for the most central actors are shown in Table 4-5.

Overall, about 22% of the interest groups are linked by participating in at least one common Advisory Group. Centralization of the co-membership network of is 25%, i.e. a centre can be discerned.

The important role of COPA is highlighted by its high betweenness centrality score, which is because it is the only organization which is a member of all Advisory Groups (excluding the “Green Group of Eight”). The EEB and the WWF, the representation of consumers (BEUC) and trade unions (EFFAT) have some potential for being information brokers.

Table 4-5: Betweenness centrality of interest groups in the co-membership network of EU agricultural Advisory Groups

Interest group	Betweenness centrality (normalized; %)
COPA	25.5
EEB	8.8
WWF	7.8
BEUC	6.2
EFFAT	6.1
BIRDLIFE	4.5
CIAA	2.8
CPE	2.7
CEJA	2.6
CEIBOIS	1.6
COCERAL	1.6
EFNCP	1.6
EUROCOMM	1.3
Other interest groups	< 1

Source: own data (EU-level actor interviews, autumn 2004); based on UCINET results

Comparing Table 4-5 with Figure 1-1 shows that the number of Advisory Groups at which an organization is present is not the only way to assess its importance. From a network perspective, the potential to broker information is meaningful. This potential is the higher the more other organizations an actor meets and thus can exchange information with. This number increases either by attending a high number of different Advisory Groups or by meeting many different actors in a smaller number of Advisory Groups. Some of the well represented organizations (as based on number of Advisory Groups attended) have a limited scope of activity; their interest is focussed on a specific policy issue.

The network perspective is highlighted here, because in a decision-making process it is important for policy actors to have the possibility of meeting each other and exchanging opinions, discussing strategies or seeking political support. Discussion of the Advisory Group's particular issue is not of exclusive importance, but keeping in contact with other policy makers and creating alliances for a long-term strategy are incentives for interest groups to attend the consultative bodies. This hypothesis was confirmed by the interest groups interviewed for our survey. They agreed that the overall significance of the Advisory Groups is not so much to have direct influence on the policy outcome. It was even mentioned that the European Commission uses these bodies more to inform interest groups about ongoing political discussion than to seek their advice. The interest-group representatives found it much more important that they met with each other at the Advisory Group sessions and obtained first-hand information about current policies. In the next section, we will therefore examine the informal network based on contacts that actors maintain with each other.

4.2.2 Informal contact network of actors involved in EU organic farming policy

The networks presented in the following should be seen as an extract of the complete agricultural policy network; organic farming is perceived as a sub-domain of agriculture at the whole. The large number of interest groups active in agricultural policy at the EU made it necessary to concentrate on selected actors and then attempt to derive conclusions for the overall situation of organic farming policy. The actors interviewed are presented in more detail before moving to the results of the analyses of the networks established between them.

EU network actors

As described in chapter 2.4, we aimed at including the most important policy actors of organic farming policy, as well as those actors who are said to be influential for general agricultural policy. From the EU institutions, DG AGRI, DG ENVI, the European Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) and the Commission for agriculture of the European Parliament (EP-AGRI) were selected for interviews and four permanent representations of member states were included: Austria and Denmark as they have played an important role in the development of an organic farming policy; furthermore Germany and France as representatives of the large member countries. Organizations interviewed were farmers' interest groups represented by COPA and the European Council for Young Farmers (CEJA), the EU level organic farming organization IFOAM EU, the environmental groups BIRDLIFE, EEB and Friends of the Earth Europe (FOEE), the consumer groups BEUC and the European Community of Consumer Cooperatives (EUROCOOP) and, finally, the representation of trade unions, EFFAT.

Though all are involved in organic farming policy to some extent, the policy actors vary in the amount of resources they dedicate to that policy

issue. Only IFOAM EU invests all of its time resources in organic farming, which reflects the organization's role as the umbrella organization for organic food and farming in Europe. However, there are currently only 1.5 persons (full-time equivalent) working at the Brussels office so that the total time spent on lobbying for organic farming remains limited. All other policy actors spend far less time on organic farming policy, from about 10% of total working staff to nearly zero. There are many reasons for this. For environmental interest groups, consumers' groups and workers' groups, organic farming is just a sub-item of agriculture which, itself, is only one amongst a high number of policy issues they are engaged in. The relatively few resources that farmers' organizations spend on organic farming indicate that this policy issue is not a priority on their agenda. But here one should also keep in mind that farmers' organizations tackle various agricultural concerns. As to the EU Commission, the representatives of DG AGRI and DG ENVI dedicate less than 5% of their working time to organic farming. Of the member states, the permanent representations of Germany and Austria allocate slightly more resources to organic farming than do the permanent representations of Denmark or France.

The understanding of the situation of interest groups with regard to their ability to take part in the policy process is improved by a self-assessment of the organizations. The environmental organizations and IFOAM EU point to their strong network of experts on which they can rely even though the staff working directly at the EU level is limited. They feel well supported by their national member organizations and see an advantage in the reciprocal good contacts with and between them. Their main problems are a lack of financial or time resources and manpower. In contrast, lack of manpower and other resources is not an issue for most of the organizations that have been active at the EU level for a long time already. COPA stresses its high number of members and claims to represent all (or at least most of the) farmers in Europe. However, this strength is also a weakness for the organization at the same time. The high diversity of members causes some problems in finding common political positions that can then be lobbied for.

Our network analysis focuses especially on the role of the IFOAM EU Group as the only interest-group lobbying exclusively for organic farming at the EU level and three environmental interest groups: FOEE, BIRDLIFE and EEB. In the following the four organizations in question will be referred to as the "core organics". Experts assess these organizations as advocating organic farming and their opinions are supported by results from the national level analyses that often revealed a fairly important involvement of environmental groups in organic farming policy. We will critically review this assumption. Another reason for looking at the role of these organizations in the agricultural network is that they have not been considered in previous studies (Henning & Wald 2000). While the roles of interest groups representing producers and industries as well as consumers have been analysed thoroughly, environmental interest groups had been judged as too marginal to be taken into account. If we presume that these groups are working on organic farming policy issues and we see organic farming as a part of

general farming policy then it is of interest to analyse how groups active in this sub-issue are linked to the broader network of the CAP.

EU level network analysis

Our analysis focuses on two networks: as an example for an organic farming policy network we present the network which was established during the elaboration of the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming. The role of different agricultural policy actors is analysed and we are interested in the connection of the organic farming policy network with the general CAP network. The roles of the most important CAP actors in the organic farming policy network are examined and we discuss what role these actors play in the CAP network. To see how important CAP issues are for the group of “core organics” (see above) we will analyse their activities in the CAP, in our case represented by the policy process of the midterm review of the Agenda 2000, and compare them with those for the Organic Action Plan. However, our aim is not to analyse in detail which positions were successfully lobbied for in the two policy processes. Our analytical focus lies primarily on the structure of the two policy networks.

The network of the EU Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming

The EU Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming was elaborated over a period of five years from a first formulation of the idea at a European Conference in Vienna 1999 (organized by the Commission and the Austrian Government) to the final communication of the Commission in 2004. On the way lay another Conference, this time hosted by the Danish Government in 2001, as well as two hearings by the European Parliament (2003) and the Commission (2004). The CoAM became engaged in the process in 2001 when it requested the Commission to draw up an Action Plan. In 2002, the CoAM received an interim report and finally, in 2004 accepted the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming. The Commission also set up an expert group and, in 2003, opened an internet consultation on the Action Plan (Stolze & Lampkin 2005).

The Vienna Conference can be considered as the starting point for the elaboration of an European Action Plan and the further steps undertaken are part of the decision-making phase of this Action Plan. As conferences and hearings offer the opportunity for interest groups to meet and exchange their points of view, as well as to develop common strategies, the participation of policy actors is presented in Table 4-6.

Table 4-6: Involvement of EU organic farming policy actors interviewed in the survey in autumn 2004 in the policy process of developing the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming

Policy Actor	Event in the policy process				
	Vienna conference 1999	Copenhagen conference 2001	EP hearing	COMM hearing	Member of expert group
IFOAM EU	x	x	x	x	x
EEB		x		x	x
FOEE				x	
BIRDLIFE					
BEUC		x	x	x	x
Euro Coop		x		x	x
EFFAT		x			
CEJA				x	
COPA		x	x	x	x
DG-AGRI	x	x	x	x	x
DG- ENVI	x	x	x	x	
EP-AGRI		x	x	x	
ECOSOC				x	
Representation of Austria	x	x		x	x
Representation of Denmark	x	x		x	
Representation of Germany	x	x		x	
Representation of France				x	x

Source: Attendee lists and conference programmes of the events

The organization that was most involved in the elaboration of the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming is the IFOAM EU. It attended all conferences and participated in the hearings of the European Parliament and the Commission. Furthermore, IFOAM EU was a member of an expert group appointed by DG AGRI (DG Agri 2002). The Vienna conference included only a few of the policy actors of interest here while the Copenhagen conference attracted many more interest groups and institutions. The hearing organized by the EP did not have a high importance for the policy actors, and besides the institutional bodies involved, only three interest groups (IFOAM EU, BEUC, COPA) took part by making presentations (Europäisches Parlament - Ausschuss für Landwirtschaft und ländliche Entwicklung 2003). In contrast, the hearing organized by the Commission assembled nearly all policy actors

considered in our investigation. Only the environmental group BIRDLIFE and EFFAT did not attend this event.


Overall, three categories of actor involvement (measured by the number of events in which an actor participated) can be distinguished. First, highly involved actors (IFOAM EU, BEUC, COPA, Austria, Denmark and Germany) with IFOAM EU and the three EU member states as initiators of the process. Second, actors with a medium involvement (EEB and EUROCOOP that became engaged in the Action Plan process in 2001 and France attending the Commission's hearing and the expert group). Third, there are actors that did not engage much in the process (EFFAT, FOEE, BIRDLIFE, CEJA). The European institutions (the two DGs and the European Parliament) have obviously been involved in the process for institutional reasons whereas the ECOSOC played a subordinate role. The reason for the relatively low involvement of the two environmental groups is their different policy focus. Organic farming is not an interesting policy issue in itself, but only a means for achieving other targets. Therefore, direct lobbying for organic farming is limited. CEJA became interested in organic farming only at the time of the Commission's hearing.

We will now discuss whether the diverging degree of actors' involvement is reflected in the way that the interest groups and institutions interacted with each other. The interaction network – shown in Figure 4-2 – is based on statements that actors made in the course of the interviews in autumn 2004 and mirrors their memory of the contacts made. As a consequence, the interaction reported here does not reflect the whole policy process of the elaboration of the Action Plan as policy actors are not expected to remember all contacts they have made during a five year time span. The network shows how actors worked together during the last decision-making phase where interest groups became involved, i.e. the emphasis is placed on the Commission's hearing. In particular, contacts that had possibly been established through a co-membership in the expert group for the Action Plan seem to have been neglected by the interviewees.

A link in the network is established if an actor indicated contact with another regardless of whether this contact was confirmed. It is thus more likely that a link exists between two actors that have been interviewed than between an interviewee and an actor that was not considered for interviews. Still, the network is helpful for exploring the relational structure of the policy process connected with the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming. Figure 4-2 shows close contact between actors with a thick line and loose contact with a thin line. Actors not connected to the network are so-called isolates.

About 11% of all possible links between actors are established. Only considering the actually interviewed actors and their interrelations raises the density of the network to 20%.

Figure 4-2: Network of policy actors in the process of elaborating the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming



Source: own data (EU-level actor interviews, autumn 2004) based on UCINET results; drawn with NetDraw 1.0

The only actor without a stated involvement in the Action Plan process is the French representation. However, France had been a member of the expert working group as a representative of the Standing Committee for Organic Farming (SCO). Therefore, the missing contact here might be due to the fact that a different representative from France responded to the interviews than was working in the expert group. With regard to the interest groups' involvement, the network is strongly centralized around the IFOAM EU Group¹⁰ who established direct links with nearly two-thirds of all actors involved.¹¹ Also from a global point of view, this actor is central to the network, which is indicated by a high score for betweenness centrality. In addition, DG AGRI and BEUC play a central role, although their degree of activity is clearly lower than that of IFOAM EU. Environmental organizations such as FOEE, EEB and especially BIRDLIFE do not play an important role in the Action Plan network, and COPA is a peripheral actor in this context as well.¹²

The prominent role of IFOAM EU is, once again, well illustrated when we look at cliques. In the network under consideration there are 15 cliques and IFOAM EU is a member of all of them. This is a sign that IFOAM EU

10 The network centralization index based on betweenness centrality is 51.09%

11 IFOAM's normalised degree centrality amounts to 65.4%

12 Normalised betweenness centrality for various actors: IFOAM 53.8%, DG-AGRI 26.4%, BEUC 23.3%, FOEE 9.0%, EEB 1.6%, BIRDLIFE 0%, COPA 0.6%

is recognized as a policy actor with a clear focus on organic farming which is approached when working on an organic-farming- specific issue such as the Action Plan. No clique worked on the Action Plan independently from IFOAM EU, which shows that IFOAM EU was in a position to bring its points of view into the discussion. DG AGRI and BEUC are also members of several cliques – reflecting their central position in the network.

These subgroups, however, do not imply that their members share the same opinion on the Action Plan. Interaction may well occur even when two actors have distinct views on a policy issue. However, no important disagreements were reported, and most interviewees stated that other policy actors could easily be approached. Only IFOAM EU mentioned some difficulties in approaching COPA, which can be explained by their competitive relationship over who should be the main representative of organic farmers. COPA's claim to be the representative of all farmers in the EU is challenged by an organization that claims to represent the whole of organic agriculture. Nevertheless, there is contact between them, and together with the two consumers' organizations EUROCOOP and BEUC they are co-members in two subgroups. The environmental organizations see difficulties in getting in contact with COPA, which they partly explain in terms of highly diverging opinions about the general direction of CAP development. Partly they imagine that opinions vary widely among COPA members, which may hinder finding a clear COPA position on a specific issue. And without a clear position, they suggest, COPA might find it difficult to contact other policy actors.

Compared to the involvement in the different events as shown in Table 4-6, the highly involved member states Austria, Denmark and Germany are not central in the contact network, and IFOAM EU did not seek contact with them during the last phase of the Action Plan elaboration. The role of the consumers' organization BEUC is confirmed by the network analysis result, as is the ambiguous role of the environmental organizations.

A more general point of view on the importance of actors for organic farming policy is taken when asking the interviewees to name the three most important organizations or institutions for this policy field. The most frequently mentioned actors are listed in Table 4-7 and reputational power is indicated as the share of interviewees that named this actor as one of the three most important.

The highest reputational power is thus assigned to one or more specific member states or, on a more abstract level, "all member states", represented in the (Agricultural) Council of the EU as the most influential for organic farming policy making in the past two to three years. Germany and Denmark were mentioned most often in this context. From all interest groups, the IFOAM EU Group enjoys the highest reputation whereas COPA is seen as influential by less than one third of the actors interviewed (see Annex 7.4). The Commission as a whole is important according to about one third of the interviewees, with DG AGRI being of particular importance. Other organizations or institutions have been mentioned only by a few interviewees and, in

consequence, do not enjoy a high reputational power for organic farming policy. Overall, the reputational power of actors reflects their involvement in the elaboration of the Action Plan as measured by their participation in particular events (see Table 4-6).

Table 4-7: Reputational power for organic farming policy of selected actors*

Policy actor	Reputational power
Member States / COUNCIL	59%
IFOAM EU	47%
Commission	35%
COPA	29%

*indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming an actor as one of the three most important

Source: own data (EU-level actor interviews, autumn 2004)

After this exploration of the organic farming policy network, the following section discusses the links between this network and the general farming policy field. Here the line of inquiry is whether and in what way general farming policy actors have an interest in organic farming policy.

Relationship between the organic and general farming policy network

The distribution of reputational power roughly describes the structure of the general farming policy field. From Table 4-8 one can see that COPA and the member states as a whole or represented by the Council, enjoy the highest reputation for general farming policy. The Commission has a high influence, as well, but the intergovernmental institution is more important. France has a particular influence in the general farming policy process. This assessment is based on only a few statements made, but nevertheless reflects Henning’s findings that the most important actors in the CAP network are the Commission and the large EU member states, as well as COPA (Henning & Wald 2000).

Table 4-8: Reputational power for general farming policy of selected actors*

Policy actor	Reputational power
Member States / COUNCIL	53%
COPA	53%
Commission	35%
France	35%
IFOAM EU	0%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming an actor as one of the three most important

Source: own data (EU-level actor interviews, autumn 2004)


Comparing this reputational power with the power of actors for organic farming policy, as given in Table 4-7, shows that the European

institutions are powerful both in general farming policy and in the particular policy field of organic farming. The most influential interest group differs for the different policy fields, with IFOAM EU standing for organic farming and COPA for the general farming policy field. COPA does have some influence on organic farming directly, but IFOAM EU is assigned a higher competence in this sub-field of the CAP.

When looking at the Action Plan network shown in Figure 4-2 once again, one observes that most of the actors described as “important” in the CAP network of Henning and Wald (2000), such as the farmers’ unions and permanent representations of the large EU member states, are missing. Of the strongly involved supranational interest groups, EFFAT and EUROCOOP are part of the Action Plan network. However, their activity remains as limited as that of COPA – clearly the strongest interest group in the CAP network. The national representatives that are classified as important by Henning and Wald (2000), France and Germany, are also situated in the periphery of the Action Plan network. In contrast, the consumers’ interest group BEUC, which is fairly central in that network, is classified as less involved in the CAP network. EUROCOMM, as the fifth interest group that is part of both the CAP and the Action Plan network, is only weakly involved in both networks. In contrast, the Commission (DG AGRI) plays a central role in both networks, thus reflecting its institutional role. Even though not all CAP network actors were interviewed on their activities for the Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming, the fact that none of the actors interviewed claimed to have much contact with them points to their low involvement in organic farming policy. t


We will now turn to the core organic group (see above) and compare their activity for the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming with their involvement in the midterm review of the Agenda 2000 (MTR) – for an illustration of the networks see Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4.

Figure 4-3: Contacts of the “core organics” in the Action Plan network



Source: own data (EU-level actor interviews, autumn 2004); based on UCINET results; drawn with NetDraw 1.0

Figure 4-4: Contacts of the “core organics” in the MTR network



Source: own data (EU-level actor interviews, autumn 2004); based on UCINET results; drawn with NetDraw 1.0

Environmental groups are not considered in the CAP network analysis of Henning and Wald (2000) so it is reasonable to estimate their involvement in CAP issues from their activity using the example of the MTR policy process. A question concerning the actors' involvement in this policy process was included in the questionnaire for the EU-level face-to-face interviews. In this way, it was possible to conduct an analysis of the relations that the core organic actors established with other EU policy actors during the discussion of the MTR. This MTR network is compared to the extracted network of the core organic group in the Action Plan network. That is, for both policy network analyses only the answers from the IFOAM EU, FOEE, BIRDLIFE and EEB are taken into consideration.

Table 4-9 presents selected features of the two networks that are pictured in Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4.

Table 4-9: Main features of the networks of core organic actors concerning the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming and the MTR

Network feature	Action Plan Network	MTR Network
Size	18	20
Density	12.4%	20.5%
Centralization	95.6%	4.5%

Source: own data (EU-level actor interviews, autumn 2004); based on UCINET results

The MTR network is slightly larger than the Action Plan network. Many more links are established in the MTR network (i.e. the density is higher), which shows that overall, more contacts were made by the actors regarding this general CAP issue than regarding organic farming. Except for IFOAM EU, all actors established more links to other members of the network in the MTR policy process than in the Action Plan process. The most striking difference between the two networks is the different level of centralization (based on the betweenness centrality). The Action Plan network resembles a fully centralized star graph to more than 95% and thus is highly centralized around one central actor, the IFOAM EU. By contrast, in the MTR network, centrality is distributed among the three actors EEB, FOEE and BIRDLIFE, which results in a low centralization of 4.5%. In this network, IFOAM EU does not play a central or active role. All environmental organizations show a high activity level in the MTR network (indicated by their betweenness centrality), but not in the Action Plan network.

4.2.3 Main findings on EU level networks

From a network perspective, environmental and workers' interest groups are more central in the general farming policy network than organizations dealing with specific agricultural policy issues. They are thus important information brokers. All the same, COPA remains the

most important policy actor from both perspectives, i.e. its representation in Advisory Groups and its centrality in the co-membership network. The strength of this largest interest group of European farmers is, however, challenged by the high diversity of opinions existing throughout its national member organizations. By contrast, the environmental and organic farming organizations aim at compensating for their lack of resources through internal and external networking and make use of their role as experts in their issues of special interest.

At the EU level, a group of supporters of organic farming exists which is comprised of organic farming organizations, consumer and environmental interest groups and some member states, particularly AT and DK. Nevertheless, this support has not been transformed into continued political activity for organic farming policy. Even environmental groups that are found among the most supportive actors have not yet become engaged in an organic farming policy network.

The role that particular member states played in the official steps of the formulation of the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming (i.e. preparatory conferences and hearings) is not reflected in the network of contacts established during the final period of the Action Plan development. Member states do not appear as a target of interaction by many other policy actors; moreover IFOAM EU did not seek a policy strategy targeted at the inter-governmental level.

4.3 Policy instruments and strategies for organic farming policy on EU level

So far, we have illustrated the political structures of organic farming at the EU level against the background of the general environment for organic farming policy. This section targets the content of policy, focussing on how policy makers and actors in policy networks accept specific organic farming policy strategies and instruments. The aim is to contribute to the development of a framework for the future implementation of organic farming policy instruments as initiated in another part of the EU-CEE-OFP project and documented by Zerger et al. (2005) and Häring et al. (2006). Whereas they formulated problem areas for the development of the organic sector and goals to address them, we here aim at providing a broader basis for the assessment of different policy strategies and instruments. The analysis is again based on the web-based survey among 123 policy actors from the EU and the national level. They have been characterized in chapter 4.1. We address the question if there are particular groups of policy actors that favour particular policy strategies and look for factors determining the acceptance or rejection of specific policy instruments.

4.3.1

Policy instruments and strategies submitted for interviewees' assessment

Policy strategies and instruments included in our survey were chosen on the basis of problem areas and policy goals. These had been defined at a workshop with representatives from EU member states and EU level experts (Zerger et al. 2005) building on a series of national workshops (Häring 2005). In this way, the following 22 policy strategies and instruments were identified and evaluated by the respondents. The explanations given should help to understand the single policy strategies by highlighting the arguments that participants mentioned in the course of the workshops. Not all of the 20 priority policy goals that resulted from the EU workshop could be translated into policy strategies or instruments. Some of the instruments listed below are founded on one of the goals, but have not been mentioned as such by the participants.

Integration of organic farming in all policy fields

This strategy describes a process of “mainstreaming” organic farming, i.e. aspects of organic farming should be considered in all policy fields that might have an influence on the European agricultural sector.

Explicit consideration of both conventional and organic farming in all future CAP reforms

All future changes of EU agricultural policy should be tested explicitly for their effects on the organic farming sector. Together with the policy strategy on integration of organic farming in all policy fields (see above) this strategy had not been included in the list of 20 priority policy goals, but they both had been mentioned during workshops.

Promotion of organic farming as a model for a sustainable rural development

With a view to the reform of the EU rural development programmes this strategy, on the one hand, invites organic stakeholders to become more ambitious. On the other hand it is addressed at the EU policy makers to promote organic farming as a role model for a sustainable rural development.

Setting quantitative targets for organic farming share

The workshop participants saw it as a shortcoming of the European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming that it does not quantify any targets on the share of organically managed farmland or on the market share of organic produce. For a development of the organic sector such a quantification of policy goals was seen as helpful.

Promotion of organic farming as a preferred management option in regions of high nature conservation value (without restricting organic farming to these areas)

This strategy builds on the scientific evidence that organic farming contributes to conservation of biodiversity and constitutes a form of land management that highly respects the natural preconditions of an environment.

Encouragement of local and regional food sovereignty

The background of this policy strategy is that local markets and a short distribution chain should be encouraged especially for organic produce. “Regional” and “organic” are seen as promising partner concepts for local food sovereignty.

Promotion of consumer awareness

This strategy would cover informing consumers about the integrated benefits of organic farming, in terms of health and environmental aspects, and should focus on personal experiences of consumers with organic farming.

Enhanced training and advice (technical assistance) for actors along the whole organic food chain

Although not included in the list of the 20 priority policy goals enhanced training and advice could contribute to the development of the organic farming sector. Such a strategy should hereby cover all levels along the food chain.

Capacity building of organic sector actors targeted on political work

This strategy addresses the perceived lack of ability of organic farming actors to form a strong political partner in the policy making process.

Capacity building in the EU Commission targeted on organic farming

This strategy bases on the assumption that organic farming is not well enough known to members of the EU Commission.

More research and development targeted on organic food and farming issues

Workshop participants felt that there was an important need for further knowledge, in their opinion, on the effects of organic farming, e.g. on health and nature. Furthermore, quality and consumer behaviour should be an issue of further research, as well as research in support of policy.

Action Plans for Organic Farming

Action plans for organic farming are already in place in various European countries and at the EU level. Still, we were interested in an assessment of such a relatively well-known policy instrument.

Harmonization of inspection and certification in the EU

In the common market of the EU, harmonized inspection and certification are assumed to be likely to support the development of organic farming. Workshop participants felt there was potential to make inspection and certification more effective.

Establishing GMO-free zones

The debate on introducing GMOs into agriculture has a strong implication for organic farming practice. The problem of co-existence of organic and GMO agriculture has not, so far, been successfully solved by legislation. One possible way could be to design zones where GMO are not allowed.

Area payments for conversion to organic farming and Area payments for maintenance of organic farming

Both payments for conversion to and maintenance of organic farming are currently granted to organic farmers in most of the EU countries. We

included them in the list in order to obtain an assessment of how these broadly implemented instruments are in fact accepted by policy stakeholders.

Investment support for production of organic food and
Investment support for processing of organic food

These two instruments on supporting investments are founded in the policy goal formulated by workshop participants as “support appropriate technology and product innovation in business (in the whole food chain).”

Taxes on conventional farm inputs (e.g. pesticides, mineral fertilisers)
and

Reduced value added tax (VAT) for organic products

Tax policy was rated very highly by the workshop participants, who found taxes addressing both the supply side (of conventional produce) and the demand side (for organic buyers) important.

Support of marketing institutions working with organic produce and
Support of market cooperation, e.g. producer groups

Market development should be especially supported as part of a rural development programme. Networks of producers should be encouraged, according to the workshop participants.

Use of organic food in public procurement

The idea behind this policy instrument is that a type of land management that produces public goods should be supported by public institutions. Organic food should be served in public buildings, schools and canteens.

Establishment of round tables / discussion forums for organic farming

This policy instrument is based on the policy goal to improve dialogues between producers and consumers. On the other side, such discussion forums could have a political dimension and thus contribute to the further development of organic farming.


4.3.2 Overview of the acceptance of different EU policy instruments and strategies

Policy instruments and strategies can be evaluated at two levels. One is an assessment of how far an instrument is suitable to solve a policy problem, in our case, whether it is suitable to contribute to the further development of organic farming. The second level is if a policy instrument is accepted by the different policy stakeholders. Even if a policy actor is interested in promoting organic farming, the actor might not be in favour of a certain type of policy instruments, e.g. some policy actors favour push factors, others prefer to support the demand side. To give respondents the possibility of a differentiated assessment of the policy instruments and strategies presented, we explicitly addressed suitability and acceptance in separate questions. Moreover, the acceptance of policy instruments that are targeted at the development of organic farming may be influenced by the general attitude of the actors towards organic farming as a policy goal. At the EU, organic farming is often perceived as a means to achieve broader policy goals, such as

environmental or rural development goals (European Commission 2000b). This means that an actor's choice is not only between different policy instruments that aim at promoting organic farming, but could also include other non-organic options. This will affect how policy actors view the acceptability of different instruments.

Our analysis shows that the perceived suitability of a policy instrument correlates at a medium to high level with its acceptance. It seems that the interviewees did not clearly distinguish between the two questions, or that they accepted a policy instrument the more they thought it promoted organic farming. Having said that, it should be pointed out that COPA only made statements on the suitability of policy instruments, but not on their acceptance (except for the harmonisation instrument which it strongly favours). This actor thus made a clear distinction between the two aspects whereby it stressed that, in COPA's point of view, organic farming should be promoted, but not at the expense of the support of conventional agriculture. In the following we will concentrate on the acceptance of policy instruments as it can be assumed that the statements on the suitability of instruments are influenced by the interviewees' attitudes towards these instruments. Figure 4-5 shows the different rates of acceptance of policy instruments submitted to EU level policy actors. At least 50% of all respondents slightly or strongly favoured all policy instruments except for the setting of quantitative targets for organic farming.

Figure 4-5: Acceptance of policy instruments and strategies



Source: own data (EU-level web-based survey, spring 2005)

Figure 4-5 sorts the policy instruments according to the proportion of them which are strongly favoured, and one can see that only two instruments are highly accepted by more than half of the policy actors interviewed, specifically “promotion of consumer awareness” and

“enhanced training and advice along the whole organic food chain”. Nearly half of the respondents would strongly favour a policy strategy to harmonize inspection and certification throughout Europe, more research and development targeted on organic farming issues, support of organic farming marketing institutions and the use of organic food in public procurement. At the same time, not many respondents would reject these instruments. When we total up the two favourable ratings of policy instruments we find that nine out of the 24 instruments suggested in total would be accepted by at least 75% of the respondents whereas they would be rejected by only a few (taking account of the undecided and the “don’t know” votes, the rejection rate is clearly less than 25%).

“Harmonization of inspection and certification” is the only policy instrument which was accepted by all respondents (to different degrees) except one who was undecided. Two instruments were only weakly rejected while achieving a high level of acceptance: “promotion of consumer awareness” and “action plans”.

The most frequently rejected policy instruments and strategies are: “quantitative targets for organic farming share” (rejected by one-third of the respondents), “encouragement of regional and local food sovereignty”, “integration of organic farming in all policy fields”, “taxes on conventional farm inputs”, “establishment of GMO-free zones”, “reduced VAT for organic products” and “promotion of organic farming as a role model for sustainable rural development”.

In addition to merely describing the acceptance or rejection of specific policy instruments we were interested in the factors that determine the policy actors’ judgements. However, the large number of policy instruments and strategies makes a systematic analysis difficult. Therefore, a factor analysis was effected that reduced the 24 policy instruments and strategies to five factors.

Factor analysis

By clustering instruments and strategies together that show a similar pattern of acceptance, five factors were identified that explain 78% of the total variance of the actors’ choices.

The first factor comprises mostly policy strategies which target issues relating to the production and marketing of organic produce. It explains nearly 46% of the total variance and contains nine instruments.

Factor 1: “Market development”

- Support of market cooperation, e.g. producer groups
- Support of marketing institutions working with organic produce
- Encouragement of local and regional food sovereignty
- Investment support for processing of organic food
- Investment support for production of organic food
- Use of organic food in public procurement

- Promotion of organic farming as a role model for a sustainable rural development
- Promotion of organic farming as preferred land management in regions of high nature value (without restricting organic farming to these areas)
- Establishing GMO-free zones

Instruments included in factor 1 aim, firstly, at assisting the initiatives of producers of organic food by supporting their investments and marketing efforts. Secondly, these strategies affect the environment in which organic products are marketed. Strategies that have a broader scope and focus on the quality of a region in which production takes place (be it a GMO-free zone or a region of high nature value) are perceived similarly by the respondents.

A second factor comprises four strategies and explains 14% of the total variance. The strategies comprised aim at implementing organic farming issues in different fields of action, so we labelled it:

Factor 2: “Mainstreaming organic farming”

- Explicit consideration of both conventional and organic farming in all future CAP reforms
- Enhanced training and advice (technical assistance) for actors along the whole food chain
- Promotion of consumer awareness of organic food and farming
- Integration of organic farming in all policy fields

The strategies included here call for the integration of organic farming issues into all policy processes, ask for the promotion of consumer awareness, and demand action within the organic sector itself.

Rather in opposition to the approach of factor 2 instruments, the third factor (explaining for 8% of the total variance) assembles policy instruments that are specifically targeted on organic farming and furthermore mostly related to its regulatory framework.

Factor 3: “Traditional supply-side policy instruments”

- Area payments for maintenance of organic farming
- Area payments for conversion to organic farming
- Harmonization of inspection and certification in the EU

Both types of area payments are grouped into this factor, bearing in mind that these instruments are nothing new to the European organic farming policy. The need for harmonising the inspection and certification of organic farming standards in the EU is accepted in a similar way by the respondents.

Five policy strategies are grouped into factor 4, which explains 6% of the total variance, and they all have a certain focus on knowledge or capacity building.

Factor 4: “Knowledge and Organizational Systems”

- More research and development targeted on organic food and farming issues
- Establishment of round tables / discussion forums for organic farming issues
- Action Plans for Organic farming
- Capacity building in the EU Commission targeted on organic farming
- Capacity building of organic sector actors targeted on political work

We here find instruments that would promote gaining knowledge and capacity building (both of the organic actors and the members of the EU Commission), as well as strategies to foster information exchange between various actors.

The last factor, explaining 5% of the total variance, is a mixture of tax related instruments and a strategy of setting a clear policy target.

Factor 5: “Fiscal policy and targets”

- Reduced value added tax (VAT) for organic produce
- Taxes on conventional inputs (e.g. pesticides, mineral fertilizers)
- Setting quantitative targets for organic farming share of land area

All in all, these three instruments are only little accepted by most of the respondents. For further analysis, this factor is omitted, as it explains only 5% of the total variance and comprises quite varying instruments that make it difficult to describe this factor soundly.

4.3.3 Analysis of the factors influencing the acceptance of policy instruments and strategies

After this general overview of the assessment of different policy instruments and strategies and their grouping into five factors, the following part will analyse the reasons behind the different levels of acceptance of instruments. Various possible influences on the acceptance or rejection of instruments will be considered and the line of inquiry will be whether different types of actors show different attitudes towards policy instruments.

Assumptions and hypotheses

We explore the influence of three independent variables. First, we will examine if the type of actor (e.g. interest group, EU body etc.) in any way influences the preferences for particular policy instruments. If any interest group would expect its members to directly profit from a certain instrument, it will probably strongly vote for that particular instrument in question. Second, we test if the policy level on which the respondents

work determines their acceptance of policy instruments. As the implementation of politics causes expenses on different levels in a political system it is reasonable to assume that actors of the different levels will have different preferences. Our third assumption is based on the observation that European agricultural policy has changed significantly since the early 1990s (with the McSharry reform). In the course of this redirection of policy, a number of new organizations appeared at the EU level to lobby for their cases. The question behind this hypothesis is thus whether the newly arrived policy actors have a significantly different perception of policy instruments and strategies than the older (traditional) ones.

In addition to those independent variables, characteristics relating to the actors' political behaviour or opinions may have an influence on their assessment of the policy instruments suggested. A factor that will probably influence the position of policy actors towards certain instruments is their attitude towards organic farming. Earlier in this chapter we presented the scale of organic farming support on which the respondents had been placed. In this section, we will analyse whether the level of support determines the acceptance of policy instruments for organic farming in general, and whether particular groups of instruments, i.e. the factors resulting from the factor analysis, are more favoured than others by actors with varying attitudes. In addition to testing this hypothesis we will look at the influence of two other characteristics of the respondents. One is their knowledge of organic and general farming regulations. The hypothesis here is that actors who do not know much about the regulations targeted at organic farming will be uncertain of the policy instruments suggested, since they are unfamiliar with the point of reference. Their assessment of specific policy strategies might furthermore be influenced by their perception of the impact that the introduction of GMOs into agricultural practice will have on organic farming. We assume that actors who do not see organic farming as jeopardized by GMOs will not have a particular interest in declaring GMO-free zones, for example. However, all these hypotheses remain to be tested.

Results

It is mostly nominal variables describing the characteristics of the respondents to our questionnaire that we are interested in. For this reason, cross tabulation of the independent variables and the factor values for the four policy instrument factors identified was done, accompanied by a chi-squared test (based on the likelihood ratio).¹³

Actor types

Interviewees had been divided into eight different types of organizations comprising non-governmental organizations lobbying for different

¹³ Usually, the Pearson formula is used to calculate the chi-squared value. As our sample is fairly small, expected frequencies were smaller than 5 in most of the cells. Therefore, the likelihood ratio was applied for calculating the chi-squared value. The formula is: $X^2 = -2 * \sum f_o * \ln(f_o/f_e)$

interests (farmers, consumers, agri-industry, environment), permanent representations of the member states and the EU Commission (see Table 4-1). These types of organization, however, only had a significant influence on one group of policy instruments: the “Traditional supply-side policy instruments” (factor 3). A significant influence ($p = 0.014$) could be proved for the types “European Commission” and “organic farming organization”, whereas no clear preferences could be stated for other types of organizations. The majority (i.e. a higher share than could be expected) of the respondents from the EU Commission showed a low acceptance of the factor 3 policy instruments. By contrast, all organic farming organizations highly accepted them. The high overall acceptance of the policy instrument aiming at harmonising inspection and certification in the EU, and the opposing opinions on the factor “Traditional supply-side policy instruments” are best explained by the different attitudes towards payments to organic farmers. This is understandable from the different perspectives that the EU Commission as the public body and the organic farming organization as lobby group for organic farmers take in the policy process. Whereas the former is interested in spending as little money as possible (an issue of great concern in the current debate about the EU budget), the latter has the aim of providing its clientele with as much financial support as possible. In addition, the European Commission is not a democratically elected body and therefore does not rely on voter support from organic farmers.

Working level

A highly significant level ($p = 0.006$) of cross tabulation showed that the factor “Traditional supply-side policy instruments” is influenced by the level on which the respondents work (national or EU level). EU level organizations accepted the suggested policy instruments far less than national level organizations. National level organizations include some farmers’ organizations and the national representations of member states, whereas the lion’s share of EU-level organizations consists of units in the EU Commission. Some of the variance in the acceptance of “Traditional supply-side policy instruments” is explained by the negative vote of the Commission as discussed above. A reason for the generally positive vote of national level organizations may be the current scheme of financing such payments. The member states have to pay only a share of the total payments granted to farmers via agri-environmental schemes and so the costs of such instruments are limited for them.

Duration of EU level activity

The last independent variable that was tested for its influence on the acceptance of policy instruments is the year in which an organization became active at the EU level. However, no significant influence was found. This means that, in general, younger organizations are not more open to particular policy instruments than the organizations that have been working at the EU level for a long time and could therefore have established links to other policy actors that influence their political opinions.

Attitude towards organic farming

Correlation was calculated between the score that the respondent achieved on the scale of organic farming policy and the actor’s vote on the factors (i.e. the respective factor values) of policy instruments and strategies.

The attitude of the respondents correlates on a low to medium level with their preferences for a number of the suggested policy instruments (see Table 4-10). No significant correlation was observed with those instruments targeting knowledge and organizational systems. However, there is a connection between the score on the scale of organic farming support and the acceptance of instruments for production and market, mainstreaming organic farming and specifically targeted instruments. The more positive an actor’s attitude towards organic farming is, the more likely the actor is to vote for one of these groups of policy instruments.

Table 4-10: Correlation of organic farming support score and acceptance of policy instruments

Policy instrument factor	Market development	Mainstreaming organic farming	Traditional supply-side policy instruments	Knowledge and organizational systems
Spearman-Rho	0.590**	0.421*	0.418*	-0.028

** significant at a level of $p=0.01$ * significant at a level of $p=0.05$

Source: own calculation

The knowledge of organic farming or general farming legislation (and policy documents) had no significant influence on the acceptance of policy instruments. Thus, the interviewees form their opinion on policy instruments regardless of how familiar they are with the existing regulatory framework of organic farming.

By contrast, the ongoing debate on the introduction of GMO into agricultural practice proved to influence the respondents’ assessment of policy instruments. Cross tabulation indicates that the assumed effect of GMO on organic farming significantly influences the acceptance of two instrument factors. First, at a level of $p = 0.038$, actors expecting a positive effect of GMO on organic farming show a low to very low acceptance of the factor “Mainstreaming organic farming”. However, this is explained by the negative correlation of the attitude towards GMO in agriculture with the score for organic farming support ($r = -0.67$ at $p = 0.01$). If an actor sees a positive effect of GMO on organic farming this actor is more likely to be found towards the lower end of the scale for organic farming support. As this score correlates with the acceptance of the “Mainstreaming organic farming” factor, it is not surprising to find that the GMO has a similar effect.

The same explanation could be true for the connection between the perceived influence of GMO and the acceptance of the “Market development” factor. One instrument included in this factor is the establishing of GMO-free zones. So it is interesting to investigate

whether the acceptance of this particular instrument is determined by the actor's attitude in the GMO debate. Cross tabulation of these two variables leads to highly significant results ($p = 0.01$). A relatively higher number of actors that view GMO as having a positive or no effect on organic farming are reluctant to establish GMO-free zones, whereas most of the actors that see GMO as having a negative influence on organic farming vote for such an instrument.

4.3.4 Grouping of EU organic farming policy actors and discussion of the role of the most important actors


The EU policy actors included in our survey have so far been characterized by their attitude towards organic farming, as indicated by their position on the scale of organic farming support, and (partly) by their membership in the advisory committees of DG AGRI. We will now present another grouping according to the respondents' acceptance of policy instruments.

A cluster analysis (applying the Ward algorithm), taking into account only those 33 responses that stated an opinion on all of the 24 policy instruments and strategies, identifies two clearly distinguishable clusters. The first cluster is fairly large (25 actors) and consists predominantly of actors showing a high index of organic farming support (located at positions A and B on the scale of organic farming support). By contrast, actors located at positions C and D are mostly found in the second cluster. In fact, we have a medium, but highly significant correlation of $r = 0.682$ between the score for organic farming support and assignment to one of the two clusters.

The previous paragraphs have already shown that the index of organic farming support that had been assigned to the actors in chapter 4.1.2 had some influence on their acceptance of policy instruments and strategies. We will try here to validate this index by totalling up the results of the policy instruments analysis. Therefore, a calculation is made for each respondent of how many instruments they would accept and to what extent. We thus arrive at one value for each level of acceptance per interviewee (see Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7).


One can observe that there are major differences in the number of instruments that the policy actors strongly accept. Nevertheless, most of them state that they "slightly favour" a high number of instruments. The exception in this context is COPA, which only expresses strong support for one policy instrument, "harmonization of inspection and certification", while not making a clear statement for the other 23 policy instruments.

Figure 4-6: Accepted policy instruments by actor – min. 50% strongly accepted



Source: own data (EU-level web-based survey, spring 2005)

Figure 4-7: Accepted policy instruments by actor – less than 50% strongly accepted



Source: own data (EU-level web-based survey, spring 2005)

In order to explore the assumption that the attitude of policy actors towards organic farming influences their openness to policy instruments designed to promote organic farming, the correlation between the index of organic farming support and policy instruments accepted at the different levels is calculated. Correlation coefficients are shown in Table 4-11.

Table 4-11: Correlation between the organic farming support index and the summed-up acceptance of policy instruments that promote organic farming

Sum of instruments that are...	strongly accepted	slightly favoured	slightly disliked	strongly disliked
Spearman-Rho	0.719**	0.113	-0.632**	-0.690**

** significant at a level of $p=0.01$

Source: own calculation

The two measures correlate at a medium to high level, showing that those actors that were classified as “organic farming supporters” (A) are likely to transform this positive attitude into political behaviour in favour of organic farming. By contrast, both the “hesitant” (C) and the “critical” (D) group remain hesitant when it comes to political decisions on organic farming. Interestingly, for the group of actors classified as “open to organic farming” (B) no clear prediction on their political behaviour is possible. This group contains actors that follow apparently different strategies towards policy instruments for organic farming. Thus, the scale of organic farming support has proved its explanatory power for the assessment of policy actors.

We will explore the role of individual organizations further. In chapter 4.2 we have presented the different positions of actors in the network of agricultural policy at the EU. From the side of interest groups the COPA plays an important role, and in the study by Henning and Wald (2000) this interest group was assigned a similarly central position as the EU Commission. It is therefore interesting to take a closer look at the attitude of this institution and organization towards organic farming.

All five units of DG AGRI that responded to our survey can be found either in position B or A. By contrast, the two DG TRADE units belong to the group of actors that are critical to organic farming. As regards the acceptance of policy instruments, DG AGRI is split. Whereas the units dealing with horizontal aspects of rural development (AGRI.F) strongly favour more than half of the instruments suggested, the other units (International affairs, Economics of agricultural markets and Agricultural legislation) are much more hesitant (see Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7). AGRI.H (Agricultural legislation), especially, claimed to strongly dislike a relatively high number of instruments. With this attitude it is close to the DG TRADE units, which do not show strong support for many policy instruments that could promote organic farming. Reasons behind the actors’ decision were not asked for in the survey so that clear conclusions are difficult to draw. We conclude that

DG AGRI units are in general more open to organic farming than DG TRADE ones, but that there is no agreement on political activity to operationalize the open attitude within DG AGRI.

The attitude of COPA could be very influential on the options that organic farming has at the EU. As the most important organization of European farmers, COPA is hesitant in positioning itself towards organic farming. Thus, we were unable to calculate any index of organic farming support for COPA, and this is reflected by the ambiguous position it takes when it comes to accepting or rejecting particular policy instruments. COPA would clearly favour a harmonization of inspection and certification in the EU, but does not state its position towards any other policy instrument. One reason for this can be found in the internal structure of the organization: it is accountable to 25 member organizations coming from different national backgrounds, and must find a compromise view acceptable to all these organizations. Therefore, the Brussels' office might find it difficult to assess the acceptance of particular policy instruments by the whole organization. Their basic position is that "organic farming should be promoted, but not at the expense of conventional farming" as commented in the questionnaire. In consequence, COPA does not feel that instruments that are very targeted on organic farmers would promote organic farming in the EU. For them, instruments such as area payments for conversion to organic farming or taxes on conventional farm inputs would not be suitable for the promotion of organic farming. While agreeing that some policy strategies could promote organic farming in the EU they are not likely to pro-actively support them. All in all, they are very ambiguous about organic farming.

4.3.5 Main findings on the acceptance of EU organic farming policy instruments and strategies

A considerable share of policy actors accept the various policy instruments and strategies suggested to contribute to the development of organic farming. However, the small share of actors that *strongly* favour a policy instrument reflects a general conservative attitude towards the use of political instruments to promote a special type of land management.

In the case of the group of policy instruments comprising traditional supply side instruments (area payments for conversion to and maintenance of organic farming) this viewpoint can be differentiated. The EU Commission disfavours such instruments, with an eye on the potential consequences for the EU budget. By contrast, organic farming organizations strongly accept them as a means to support their clientele's interests. For actors acting at the national level these supply support instruments are of interest as they are co-financed by the Commission and thus cause less costs for their national budgets.

The scale of "organic farming support" which we have developed has proved its explanatory power, and actors with a high score on this scale

are more likely to transform this positive attitude into political behaviour in favour of organic farming.


From the perspective of further development of organic farming policy we conclude that, at the EU level, organizations lobbying for organic farming are confronted with a powerful general farming organization that is ambiguous towards organic farming and with EU institutions that are open to organic farming, but not very active in this policy field.

5 Conclusions

Integration of the three-levels of policy analysis

From a policy analysis perspective, policy networks are a meso-level concept, as distinct from a macro-level and micro-level concept (Marsh 1998). Marsh argues that “[the meso level] has little utility as an explanatory concept unless it is integrated with macro-level and micro-level analysis” (Marsh 1998, p.15). Other authors (as, for example, Jansen 2003) see networks as the link between the micro to the macro level. In consequence, if we want to draw conclusions for the future development of organic farming policy from the networks analysed, we have to take the related macro and micro level into account. Figure 5-1 illustrates how such an integration of the three levels can be conceptualized.

Figure 5-1: *Integration of meso-level policy networks with the macro and the micro level*



Source: own representation based on Marsh (1998)

At the micro level, individual actions and decisions of network actors will have an impact on how a network develops. At the same time, the network structure will open up options for actors or constrain their activities. At the macro level, as already discussed in chapter 2 building on Thatcher (1998) and Kenis & Schneider (1991), the broader political and economic structure in a country influences the development of policy networks. Again, these networks are likely to feedback this macro level context. Following the integration argument we assume that not only the meso level networks will influence policy outcome, but that both the micro and the macro level factors will affect policy outcome.

In the network analytical context in which we discuss organic farming policy, the micro level signifies the single actors who are member of the network, bearing in mind that it is irrelevant whether an actor represents the state or the private sector. The interrelations between the actors, together with the resulting power structure, constitute the meso-level of our analysis, that is the network. A network as we perceive it is a non-hierarchical system of interrelations between both public and private actors. The macro-level of analysis is the broader context in which organic farming policy (networks) is embedded.

We will subsequently take the (meso-level) network perspective, the macro-level perspective and the micro-level perspective for both the EU and the national level and discuss what they can contribute to the understanding of the structure of the policy field of organic farming. We then focus on the consequences of this political structure for an organic farming organization with regard to possible strategies for promoting organic farming development.

Network perspective

The extent to which a network has an influence on policy outcome depends on its level of development. This level of development is indicated by the number of relevant actors of a policy field involved in the network and the degree to which they are interlinked. Furthermore, the direction of a network's influence will be determined by the most powerful actor in the network.

The EU level network of organic farming policy is currently not highly developed. The IFOAM EU Group, the only organic farming organization at this level, is recognized broadly as *the* representative for organic farming and the network is strongly centralized around this actor although the network as a whole is still relatively loose. From the national-level analyses we can see that organic farming policy networks are not well developed where this policy domain is comparatively "young": large and/or dense networks are found in old member states and Switzerland whereas in new member states they are smaller and relatively loose.

Organic farming organizations are in different positions in their national-level organic farming policy networks (see Figure 3-3). The networks also differ in terms of whether or not the central position is taken by one actor alone or shared with other actors. Based on the centrality of organic farming organizations and the question whether a central position is monopolized or not, a rank order of countries is identified with regard to the potential of organic farming organizations to influence policy outcome. Organic farming organizations have the highest "political" potential in CH, CZ and DK where they hold the central position in the network as a monopoly – although the Czech network on the whole is less developed than the other two. This group is followed by DE, IT, AT and ENG where the organic farming organization shares the network centre with another actor. The organic farming organizations' potential for influencing policy outcomes is limited in HU, SI, EE and PL, as they do not play a central role in these networks.

Macro-level perspective

From a macro-level perspective, the attitude towards organic farming and the openness of a political system towards new actors wishing to engage in a policy process determine the opportunities of an organic farming policy network. Already Michelsen et al. (2001) have stated the importance of interrelationships between organic and general farming institutions for organic farming growth. Our interest now lies in the preconditions for such interrelations. In accordance with Zanoli et al. (2000) who concluded that the degree of acceptance and the general political climate will determine organic farming's future in Europe, we explore the attitudes of general farming organizations towards organic farming.

At the EU level, policy actors could be grouped according to their attitude towards organic farming policy into "supporters", "actors open to organic farming", "actors hesitant about organic farming" and "actors critical towards organic farming". This attitude was reflected in their stated acceptance of various policy instruments to promote organic farming. However, none of the "supporters" play an important role in the general agricultural policy network. Moreover, we showed that environmental and consumer interest groups (though positive towards organic farming) have a different policy focus, and organic farming is a minor consideration for them. The Commission does not have a common position towards organic farming. In general, DG AGRI is more open towards organic farming while DG TRADE is fairly reluctant. Moreover, the most central interest group in the general agricultural network at the EU level is COPA. This organization has an ambiguous position regarding organic farming. COPA did not give any clear statements about its position towards organic farming or about its preferences for particular policy instruments.

At the national level, in most of the countries, organic farming organizations have a relatively weak position in general agricultural policy. They enjoy a high reputation for organic farming policy, but not for general farming policy. However, there is a difference between old and new member states: in most of the old member states and CH, organic farming organizations are more involved in general farming policy than in the new EU member states. With regard to the interest of general agricultural policy actors in organic farming policy, we can state a difference between countries with a dense and those with a loose organic farming policy network. In some of the dense-network countries (AT and DK), different blocks of opinion towards organic farming are observed, but interaction between the two blocks is low. There is some interest in organic farming, but this interest is limited in the case of the "non-organic" policy actors. In countries with a loose network (i.e. EE, HU, PL and SI) no opinion blocks are identified, so we can conclude that here we find a situation of indifference towards organic farming.

In addition, the different national political and socio-economic conditions determine the development of an organic farming policy network. Although this aspect was not explored in detail, we will sum up some general points. In the new EU member states, important institutional changes took place in the course of the transition from a

socialist to a capitalist system and the EU accession process. Such a major change, in general, opens up opportunities for new actors (e.g. organic farming policy actors) to enter the political debate (Kingdon 1984). Moreover, in all new EU member states, the adoption of the EU *acquis communautaire*, and along with this, of Regulation (EEC) No 1257/99 on rural development (including agri-environmental programmes) lay the basis for (financial) support of organic farming. Moreover, state bodies became engaged in organic farming policy (Moschitz et al. 2004). To summarize, the changing political environment in the new EU member states could potentially be an opportunity for organic farming policy actors to become engaged in policy making.

Micro-level perspective

The micro level of EU organic farming policy means, first and foremost, IFOAM EU. From our analysis we can conclude that it is in a delicate situation. On the one hand, its competencies regarding organic farming regulation are broadly accepted by all EU agricultural policy actors and it is represented in the official political structure. Other interest groups delegate the responsibility for organic farming issues to IFOAM EU. Yet it has limited resources and therefore there is a danger that it may not be able to deliver the expected advocacy for organic farming. On the other hand, it would be desirable as an organic farming advocate to be engaged in the general farming policy debate. But here too, the options of IFOAM EU are limited. Besides the lack of resources already stated, the organic farming interest group has difficulties in creating alliances with other actors. Although supporting organic farming in general, consumer and environmental interest groups have a different policy focus and sometimes also divergent political opinions on agricultural policy. The ambiguous role of COPA towards organic farming inhibits closer collaboration with IFOAM EU. To conclude, with regard to a further development of EU organic farming policy, IFOAM EU should continue to build up network structures (in particular with view to general agricultural policy issues) but is constrained by limited resources.

Another challenge for EU organic farming policy identified by our research is the role of the Commission. Although an Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming exists, and thus a position towards organic farming is formulated (Lampkin & Stolze 2006), the Commission is far from holding a common view. If organic farming policy was to be further developed, the Commission would need to unify its position among all units of DG AGRI. Moreover, this position concerned with organic farming should be adopted by other Directorates-General.

For all old EU member states and Switzerland, Moschitz et al. (2004) observed a political recognition of organic farming. Organic farming organizations are at least to some extent politically active. Such recognition is lacking in most of the new EU member states. Only in CZ was the organic farming organization able to take the opportunity of policy change to become a new network actor and to gain political recognition.

At the micro-level, we can conclude that an asymmetric distribution of reputation and power in two related policy domains challenges an organization's opportunity to influence a policy process in which both domains play an important role. Furthermore, it is essential for the actors involved to have clear positions in order to participate actively in a policy process. Finally, a pre-requisite for any participation in the policy process is political recognition and mutual respect of an actor – a finding that confirms the conclusions of Michelsen et al. (2001).

Strategies for policy actors

The political situation of organic farming in Europe varies at the macro level, and organic farming organizations face different challenges. The further development of organic farming policy is restricted in general by the limited interest of general farming policy actors and the lack of resources of organic farming organizations. However, our analysis showed that organic farming policy actors have differing potential to overcome this limitation.

Network analysis offers a structured approach for simultaneously analysing a variety of aspects which influence an actor's options for engaging in a policy process. In particular, the network measures of size, density and betweenness centrality can support self-assessment and help an actor to gain a differentiated insight into the framework conditions for its political work. On this basis, a policy actor can draw up a strategy and seek suitable partners in a policy process. Three aspects are identified which are relevant in this context:

- i) the centrality of the potential partner, i.e. its reputation and position in the network
- ii) the potential partner's interest in the policy issue under debate
- iii) the extent to which this actor has formulated a clear position towards the issue

Firstly, an actor will be all the more interested in a potential coalition partner, the more powerful the partner is in the policy network in question. This power is determined, on the one hand, by its role as an information broker (betweenness centrality). If an actor lies in or close to the centre of a network, it can easily reach a high number of other actors. Thus, lobbying such a central actor has a widespread effect beyond the primary target. On the other side, the impact an actor has on a policy is also affected by its reputation. The more other actors believe that an actor is of particular importance in a policy field, the more this actor can make its point heard and thus has the power to influence the policy outcome. From this point of view, for a lobbying actor it is reasonable to seek to influence the most powerful actor(s) in a network in order to achieve the largest possible effect with limited resources.

Apart from the structure of relations between actors (i.e. the network), the quality of these interrelations is of particular interest. Michelsen et al. (2001) stipulated "creative conflict" as a necessary basis of institutional interrelationships in order to further the development of organic farming. Such a creative conflict is defined as an

interrelationship between organic and general agriculture institutions built on mutual respect. Contact between them is continuous, with co-operation on some issues and competition on others. Both organic and general agriculture institutions have a joint perception of a number of common interests. This type of interrelationship between the two policy fields presupposes the existence of (a) distinct organic farming organization(s). Only when these conditions are given, Michelsen et al. (2001) argue, can organic farming persist with the agenda of the societal domains of agriculture while the integrity of organic farming is maintained. From this point of view, creative conflict with general farming institutions is a strategy that organic farming organizations should follow if they are interested in promoting organic farming. Finally, a fruitful debate is only possible if positions are clear. If they are not, a creative exchange of opinions will not be possible.

Transferred to our focus of analysis – the opportunities of organic farming organizations – this means that, at the EU level, it could be interesting for an organization such as IFOAM EU to get and stay in close contact with the interest group that is the most central policy actor in agricultural policy: COPA. By contrast, in a number of EU member states, state institutions play a central role and thus form an interesting lobbying target. Other network actors, e.g. environmental organizations, do not play a central role in the organic farming policy network, neither at the EU level nor at the national levels. Hence, from the point of view of political power, they are not first-choice coalition partners for an organic farming organization aiming at influencing organic farming policy.

With regard to the call for a creative conflict, actors are needed who have an interest in the policy issue at stake. Referring to our EU level example, COPA is an interesting coalition partner from this perspective. Although this is not its main field of interest, COPA has a high level of knowledge on organic farming legislation and can be considered as interested in the topic, at least to some extent. The interest of state institutions and general farming organizations is relatively low in a number of new EU member states that were analysed, excluding CZ. Often, a national organic farming regulation has only been implemented in order to meet the requirements of EU accession. In consequence, state actors appear a difficult lobbying target in these countries. As regards environmental organizations, their interest in organic farming policy depends on the topicality of the issue. To them, it is a sub-issue of agriculture which itself is only one of many issues they are concerned with. Hence, continuous lobbying with these organizations will be difficult.

Lastly, we argued that a fruitful debate is only possible if positions are clear. In our example at the EU level, it is at this point that a challenge arises for the organic farming organization. COPA was unable to define a clear position towards organic farming and this makes it difficult to enter in a fruitful political discussion. A similar situation is reported for the new EU member state institutions where a lack of interest in organic farming is combined with unclear positions on this policy issue. Conversely, environmental organizations stated clear opinions on organic farming policy issues at both the EU and the national level. This

makes it possible for an organic farming organization to enter into a debate with them about the further development of organic farming.

We can conclude that, although our analysis has a different focus, there are some parallels to the Michelsen et al. (2001) 'path of successful organic farming growth'. Our perspective is the effect political structures have for the potential of actors to influence organic farming policy while Michelsen et al. (2001) focuses on the growth and dissemination of organic farming in Europe. However, from both viewpoints it is argued that it is necessary to formulate clear positions on the issue and seek political recognition of the organic sector. Only on this basis can a creative conflict between policy actors develop, which is necessary in order to build up effective networks and promote organic farming in the long run.

6

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7 Annex

7.1 Questionnaire: Network Analysis at the national level

1.1 In your opinion, which factors (e.g. institutional changes, state initiatives, initiatives of the private sector,...) would stimulate the development of an organic farming policy in your country?

1.2 In your opinion, which factors (e.g. institutional changes, state initiatives, initiatives of the private sector,...) would stimulate the development of an organic farming policy in the EU?

1.3 How would you classify your organization/ institution?

2.1 In your opinion, which of the organizations and institutions listed here have an important influence on general agricultural policy in your country?

2.2 Are there any further organizations or institutions you find important in this context?

2.3 Which of the designated actors would you claim the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th most important for general agricultural policy in your country?

2.4 In your opinion, which of the organizations and institutions listed here have an important influence on organic farming policy in your country?

2.5 Are there any further organizations or institutions you find important in this context?

2.6 Which of the designated actors would you claim the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th most important for organic farming policy in your country?

2.7 Could you please indicate those actors on our list with whom you are working together or with whom you stay in regular contact in order to exchange your views on organic farming policy? It does not necessarily have to be an actor with whom you share the same opinions.

2.8 Are there actors with whom you would like to work together more closely with regard to organic farming policy? If yes, who are they and what are the obstacles to doing so?

2.9 For policy making it is important to be well informed. Using the list of organizations and institutions, could you indicate those actors to whom you regularly give information on organic farming policy issues?

2.10 From which of the actors listed do you regularly receive information on organic farming policy issues?

2.11 Could you tell us which of the actors listed share mainly the same position as your organization/ institution towards the main issues concerning the development of organic farming?

2.12 With which actors do you mostly disagree on main decisions regarding the development of organic farming?


- 3.1 How far do EU-level decisions on agricultural policy determine your organization's fields of activity?
- 3.2 Does your organization regularly engage in direct lobbying at European institutions?
- 3.3 Does your organization have access to its own office in Brussels?
- 3.4 a. Are there any European umbrella organization(s) that your organization is member of? Do you feel well represented by it (them) with regard to organic farming policy?
- 3.5 Which European institutions that are important for agricultural policy do you contact regularly?
- 3.6 Which organizations at the EU level do you see as the most relevant for general agricultural policy in Europe?
- 3.7 Which organizations at the EU level do you see as the most relevant for the development of organic farming policy in Europe?

7.2

Organic farming policy networks in eleven European countries

Key to the figures depicting the countries' networks


1. The shape of the node illustrates the actor type:



2. The colour of the actor node indicates its classification by the experts:


- black: predominantly organic farming oriented
- white: predominantly mainstream farming oriented
- grey: balanced or undefined

3. An arrow goes from actor a to actor b if actor a states that it interacts with actor b. It is reversed if actor b also states that it interacts with actor a:



4. Actors are arranged on concentric circles according to their score of betweenness centrality. The higher an actor's betweenness centrality, the closer it is to the centre of the network.

Figure 7-1: Organic farming policy network in Austria



Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04); created with Visone

Abbreviations

4Pforten	Organization for the prevention of cruelty to animals
ABG	Austrian control body for organic produce
AGEN	Association for the promotion of GMO-free food
AGES	Austrian agency for health and food security
AGRIVET	Agricultural and veterinary auditing and certification agency
AMA	Austrian agricultural marketing agency
ARGE	Organic farming organization
BBOE	Austrian farmers' union
BMGF	Ministry for generations and women
BMLFUW	Ministry for agriculture, forestry, environment and water
BOKU	University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences
BWK	Austrian Federal Economic Chamber
DEMETER	Austrian branch of the demeter organization
ERNTE	Organic farming organization
FPOE	Austrian Liberal Party
GLOB2000	Environmental organization ("Global 2000")
GRUENE	Austrian Green Party
LBI	Organic farming research institute
LEH	Expert on food retailers in Austria
OEVB	Association of mountain farmers
OEIG	Organic farming organization
OEVP	Austrian Conservative Party
PRAEKO	Presidents' conference of the Austrian chambers of agriculture
RWA	Austrian Association of cooperatives
SPOE	Austrian Social Democratic Party
VNOE	Austrian organic retailers' association


Table 7-1: Different measures of policy networks in Austria

	reputational power for organic farming policy*	reputational power for general farming policy*	betweenness centrality
<i>state institutions</i>			
BMGF	19%	8%	2%
BMLFUW	100%	100%	25%
BWK	4%	8%	0%
<i>political parties</i>			
FPOE	0%	4%	2%
GRUENE	15%	4%	2%
OEVP	4%	19%	1%
SPOE	0%	0%	0%
<i>parastatal institutions</i>			
AGES	4%	8%	5%
AMA	19%	65%	3%
PRAEKO	58%	92%	5%
<i>organic farming organizations</i>			
ARGEBLB	85%	8%	3%
DEMETER	4%	0%	1%
ERNTE	88%	8%	19%
OEIG	65%	4%	8%
<i>general farming organizations</i>			
BBOE	23%	92%	4%
<i>environmental organizations</i>			
4PFOTEN	0%	0%	0%
GLOB2000	0%	4%	1%
<i>others</i>			
ABG	12%	0%	2%
AGEN	0%	4%	2%
AGRIVET	0%	0%	0%
BOKU	4%	8%	1%
LBI	12%	0%	4%
LEH	42%	23%	0%
OEBV	0%	0%	0%
RWA	4%	19%	0%
VNOE	0%	0%	0%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as one of the five most important actors for organic / general farming policy

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

Figure 7-2: Organic farming policy network in the Czech Republic



Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04); created with Visone

Abbreviations

AKCZR	Czech Agrarian Chamber
ASZ	Association of private farmers
COLIFE	Czech branch of Country Life Ltd. – a whole food retailer
EPOS	Czech association of advisors for organic farming
GREMA	Organic products marketing company
KEZ	Czech inspection body for organic farming
LIBERA	Organic farming organization
MZECZR	Ministry of Agriculture of the Czech Republic
MZPCZR	Ministry of Environment of the Czech Republic
PKCZR	Federation of food and drink industries
PROBIO	Organic farming organization
VUZEPR	Research Institute of Agricultural Economics in Prague
ZSCZR	Czech farmers' union


Table 7-2: Different measures of policy networks in the Czech Republic

	reputational power for organic farming policy*	reputational power for general farming policy*	betweenness centrality
<i>state institutions</i>			
MZECZR	100%	100%	4%
MZPCZR	85%	15%	0%
<i>organic farming organizations</i>			
PROBIO	100%	0%	15%
LIBERA	8%	0%	0%
<i>general farming organizations</i>			
AKCZR	0%	100%	0%
ZSCZR	0%	62%	0%
<i>others</i>			
ASZ	0%	46%	0%
COLIFE	8%	0%	0%
EPOS	8%	0%	0%
GREMA	0%	0%	1%
KEZ	92%	0%	6%
PKCZR	0%	38%	0%
VUZEPR	38%	69%	0%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as one of the five most important actors for organic / general farming policy

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

Figure 7-3: Organic farming policy network in Denmark



Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04); created with Visone

Abbreviations

ARLA	Arla Foods Ltd.
COOP	Coop Denmark
DARCOF	Danish Research Centre for Organic Farming
DFFE	Directorate for Food, Fisheries and Agribusiness under the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries
DL	Danish farmers' union
DLO	Danish farmers' union, organic section
DN	Danish society for nature conservation
DO	Danish organic farming organization
FBJ	Society for biodynamic agriculture
FBR	Danish Consumer Council
FOF	Foundation for organic farming
FUD	Standing Committee on Food, Agriculture and Fisheries in the Danish Parliament
FVMD	Danish Ministry of Food, Fisheries and Agribusiness; department in charge of organic farming
HOF	House of Organic Farming
LBRP	Danish Agricultural Council
LR	Danish agricultural advisory service; organic section
OFC	Organic Food Council
PDIR	Danish Plant Directorate under the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries
SID	General workers' union

Table 7-3: Different measures of policy networks in Denmark


	reputational power for organic farming policy*	reputational power for general farming policy*	betweenness centrality
<i>state institutions</i>			
OFC	53%	0%	8%
DFFE	35%	6%	7%
FUD	82%	82%	1%
FVMD	47%	53%	0%
FVM ¹	76%	100%	-
PDIR	6%	6%	1%
<i>organic farming organizations</i>			
DLO	12%	0%	1%
DO	88%	6%	11%
HOF	35%	12%	16%
<i>general farming organizations</i>			
DL	35%	65%	1%
<i>environmental organizations</i>			
DN	0%	12%	0%
<i>retailers and their organizations</i>			
ARLA	12%	12%	0%
COOP	6%	6%	0%
LR	0%	0%	1%
<i>others</i>			
DARCOF	12%	0%	0%
FBJ	0%	0%	0%
FBR	24%	24%	5%
FOF	0%	6%	0%
LBRP	35%	88%	4%
SID	0%	0%	0%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as one of the five most important actors for organic / general farming policy

¹ not interviewed, therefore no betweenness score can be calculated

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

Figure 7-4: Organic farming policy network in England



Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04); created with Visone

Abbreviations

BRC	British Retail Consortium
CA	Countryside Agency
CITYU	City University London, Department of Health Management and Food Policy
CLA	Country Land and Business Association
CURRYC	Policy commission on the future of future of farming and food
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
EA	Environment Agency
ECOS	Eco-Stopes Consultancy
EFRC	Elm Farm Research Centre
ENATURE	English Nature
FDF	Food and Drink Federation
NATRUST	National Trust House
NFU	National farmers' union
RSPB	The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
SA	Organic farming organization
SAINS	J Sainsbury plc.
SDC	Sustainable Development Commission
SUSTAIN	Alliance for Better Food and Farming
UKROFS	United Kingdom Register of Organic Food Standards
UWA	University of Wales, Institute of Rural Sciences


Table 7-4: Different measures of policy networks in England

	reputational power for organic farming policy*	reputational power for general farming policy*	betweenness centrality
<i>state institutions</i>			
CURRYC	20%	65%	3%
CA	0%	5%	1%
DEFRA	95%	95%	30%
ENATURE	15%	5%	1%
EA	0%	15%	0%
SDC	0%	5%	2%
<i>organic farming organizations</i>			
SA	95%	5%	12%
<i>general farming organizations</i>			
CLA	5%	15%	0%
NFU	25%	70%	5%
<i>environmental organizations</i>			
NATRUST	0%	5%	0%
RSPB	25%	30%	2%
<i>retailers and retail organizations</i>			
BRC	10%	15%	1%
FDF	0%	0%	1%
SAINS	15%	0%	1%
<i>others</i>			
CITYU	0%	0%	0%
ESC	0%	0%	1%
EFRC	20%	0%	4%
SUSTAIN	25%	0%	1%
UKROFS	25%	0%	1%
UWA	15%	0%	0%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as one of the five most important actors for organic / general farming policy

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

Figure 7-5: Organic farming policy network in Estonia



Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04); created with Visone

Abbreviations

EAL	Estonian Horticultural Association
EBUE	Estonian Biodynamic Association
ELF	Estonian Fund for Nature
ELVS	Estonian beef breeders' association
EML	Estonian organic meat association
EMSA	Estonian organic farming foundation
EOUE	Estonian ornithological society
EPKK	Estonian chamber of agriculture and commerce
EPMUE	Agricultural University
EPTK	Estonian agricultural producers' central union
ERL	Estonian Green Movement
ETKL	Estonian farmers' union
OETK	Centre for Ecological Engineering
PM	Ministry of Agriculture
TTI	Plant production directorate
VTA	Veterinary and food board


Table 7-5: Different measures of policy networks in Estonia

	reputational power for organic farming policy*	reputational power for general farming policy*	betweenness centrality
<i>state institutions</i>			
PM	93%	93%	0%
TTI	47%	20%	6%
VTA	0%	27%	0%
EAL	7%	0%	0%
<i>organic farming organizations</i>			
EBUE	47%	0%	0%
EMSA	87%	0%	0%
<i>general farming organizations</i>			
EPTK	7%	67%	0%
ETKL	7%	73%	0%
ELVS	7%	0%	0%
<i>environmental organizations</i>			
ELF	33%	7%	0%
ERL	13%	0%	0%
<i>others</i>			
EML	0%	0%	2%
EOUE	7%	0%	0%
EPKK	13%	73%	0%
EPMUE	0%	7%	0%
OETK	80%	0%	0%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as one of the five most important actors for organic / general farming policy

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

Figure 7-6: Organic farming policy network in Germany



Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04); created with Visone

Abbreviations

ABL	German Small farmers' organization
AOEL	Association of organic food producers
BFN	German Federal Agency for Nature Conservation
BIOLAND	Organic farming organization
BIOPARK	Organic farming organization
BLL	German Federation of Food Law and Food Science
BMVELOE	German Federal ministry of consumer protection, food and agriculture; department organic agriculture
BOELW	Association of the organic food industry
BUND	German branch of "Friends of the Earth"
CDUCSU	Faction of conservative parties in the German Bundestag
DBV	German farmers' union
FAL	Federal Agricultural Research Centre
FIBL	Research Institute of Organic Agriculture
GREENP	German branch of Greenpeace
GRUENE	German Green Party
IFOAM	German branch of the International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements
NABU	German branch of "Birdlife International"
NATLAND	Organic farming organization
SOEL	Foundation for organic farming
SPD	German Social Democratic Party
VZBV	Federation of consumer organizations
WISSBEI	Scientific advisory council for agriculture, sustainable land use and development of rural areas
ZSL	Foundation for agricultural future

Table 7-6: Different measures of policy networks in Germany


	reputational power for organic farming policy*	reputational power for general farming policy*	betweenness centrality
<i>state institutions</i>			
BMVEL ¹	93%	96%	-
BMVELOE	14%	0%	20%
BFN	4%	4%	2%
LAENDER ¹	46%	64%	-
<i>political parties</i>			
CDU-CSU	25%	54%	0%
GRUENE	64%	75%	5%
SPD	32%	64%	5%
<i>organic farming organizations</i>			
BIOLAND	54%	11%	18%
BIOPARK	11%	0%	0%
BOELW	82%	4%	23%
IFOAM	4%	0%	0%
NATLAND	11%	4%	0%
SOEL	0%	0%	0%
<i>environmental organizations</i>			
BUND	32%	36%	2%
GREENPEACE	25%	25%	1%
NABU	32%	29%	3%
<i>general farming organizations</i>			
DBV	36%	100%	9%
<i>others</i>			
ABL	7%	14%	1%
AOEL	4%	0%	1%
BLL	4%	14%	0%
FAL	4%	4%	0%
FIBL	4%	0%	3%
VZBV	14%	18%	6%
WISSBEI	0%	0%	0%
ZSL	0%	0%	5%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as one of the five most important actors for organic / general farming policy

¹ not interviewed, therefore no betweenness score can be calculated

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

Figure 7-7: Organic farming policy network in Hungary



Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04); created with Visone

Abbreviations

AMC	Hungarian Collective Agricultural Marketing Centre at the Ministry of Agriculture and Regional Development
BIOKER	Hungarian organic traders' association
BIOKONTR	Organic control company
BIOKULT	Organic umbrella organization
BKMAGKAM	Agricultural Chamber for the Bacs-Kiskun county
DABIOKULT	Regional branch of BOKULTURA: south great plains
EMBIOKULT	Regional branch of BOKULTURA: north Hungary
FVMAGR	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Department for Agri-Environment
FVMVIDF	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Department for Rural Development
KDBIOKULT	Regional branch of BOKULTURA: middle Transdanubia
KISHANT	Kishantos Rural Development Centre
MAGGOSZ	Hungarian farmers' union
MOSZ	Organic farming organization
MSZOSZ	Hungarian farmers' union
OKOGAR	Organic inspection and certifying body
OKOTARS	Hungarian Environmental Partnership Foundation
OKTATOKUT	Organic Farming Training, Research and Advisory Association

Table 7-7: Different measures of policy networks in Hungary


	reputational power for organic farming policy*	reputational power for general farming policy*	betweenness centrality
<i>state institutions</i>			
AMC	12%	0%	3%
BKMAGKAM	0%	0%	0%
FVM ¹	59%	82%	-
FVMAGR	41%	12%	8%
FVMVIDF	6%	0%	0%
<i>organic farming organizations</i>			
BIOKULT	82%	12%	0%
DABIOKULT	12%	0%	3%
EMBIOKULT	12%	0%	0%
KDBIOKULT	12%	0%	1%
MOOSZ	29%	0%	0%
<i>general farming organizations</i>			
MAGGOSZ	6%	53%	1%
MSZOSZ	6%	59%	3%
<i>environmental organizations</i>			
OKOTARS	6%	0%	0%
<i>others</i>			
BIOKER	6%	0%	0%
BIOKONTR	59%	6%	5%
KISHANT	12%	0%	0%
OKOGAR	12%	0%	0%
OKTATOKUT	0%	0%	0%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as one of the five most important actors for organic / general farming policy

¹ not interviewed, therefore no betweenness score can be calculated

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

Figure 7-8: Organic farming policy network in Italy



Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04); created with Visone

Abbreviations

ACU	National consumers' organization
AIAB	Organic farming organization
AMAB	Mediterranean Association of Organic Agriculture
AN	National Alliance Party
CIA	National farmers' union
COAGRIC	National farmers' union
CODICO	National consumers' organization
COLDIRE	National farmers' union
CONAPAB	National Committee for organic agriculture; advisory committee of MIPAF
COPAGRI	National farmers' union
FEDERCO	National consumers' organization
FIAO	Organic farming organization
GREENP	Italian branch of Greenpeace
IAM	Mediterranean Agronomic Institute of Bari
MIPAF	Italian Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
VERDI	Italian Green Party


Table 7-8: Different measures of policy networks in Italy

	reputational power for organic farming policy*	reputational power for general farming policy*	betweenness centrality
<i>state institutions</i>			
CONAPAB	31%	0%	0%
MIPAF	56%	69%	12%
<i>political parties</i>			
AN	6%	19%	1%
VERDI	13%	0%	20%
<i>organic farming organizations</i>			
AIAB	56%	0%	0%
AMAB	31%	0%	19%
FIAO	63%	0%	7%
<i>environmental organizations</i>			
LEGAMB	0%	6%	1%
<i>general farming organizations</i>			
CIA	19%	81%	2%
COLDIRE	50%	100%	11%
COAGRIC	19%	94%	2%
<i>others</i>			
ACU	0%	6%	0%
CODICO	6%	6%	0%
COPAGRI	6%	6%	0%
FEDERCO	6%	6%	4%
IAM	0%	0%	17%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as one of the five most important actors for organic / general farming policy

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

Figure 7-9: Organic farming policy network in Poland



Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04); created with Visone

Abbreviations

ARIMR	Agency for Restructuring and Modernization of Agriculture
EKOGAL	Organic farming organization in the Subcarpathian region
EKOLAND	Organic farming organization
IJHARS	Agriculture and Food Quality Inspection
INER	Institute for Sustainable Development
KNRRRE	Coalition for the Organic Farming Development
KRIR	National Council of Agricultural Chambers
KZRKIOR	Polish farmers' union
MRIRW	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Department of Plant Breeding and Protection, Organic Farming Unit
MS	Ministry of Environment
PKE	Polish Ecological Club
PO	Civic Platform
PSL	Polish People's Party
PZ	Polish Green Party
SEKRIRW	Agriculture and Rural Development Committee of the Polish Senate
SKRIRW	Agriculture and Rural Development Committee of the Polish Parliament
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance Party

Table 7-9: Different measures of policy networks in Poland


	reputational power for organic farming policy*	reputational power for general farming policy*	betweenness centrality
<i>state institutions</i>			
MRIRW ¹	94%	94%	5%
MS	29%	12%	0%
ARIMR	41%	59%	1%
SEKRIRW	18%	29%	3%
SKRIRW	41%	53%	7%
IJHARS	41%	35%	0%
<i>political parties</i>			
PO	12%	18%	0%
PSL	18%	29%	0%
PZ	6%	6%	0%
SLD	18%	29%	0%
<i>organic farming organizations</i>			
EKOGAL	6%	6%	0%
EKOLAND	47%	12%	0%
KNRRRE	41%	12%	0%
<i>general farming organizations</i>			
KRIR	18%	18%	13%
KZRKIOR	6%	24%	0%
<i>environmental organizations</i>			
PKE	12%	24%	0%
<i>others</i>			
INER	6%	6%	12%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as one of the five most important actors for organic / general farming policy

¹ the reputational power for organic farming policy relates to the Organic Farming Unit at the MRIRW, the reputational power for general farming policy relates to the MRIRW as a whole

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

Figure 7-10: Organic farming policy network in Slovenia



Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04); created with Visone

Abbreviations

BIOFAC	Biotechnical Faculty, Department of Zootechnology
KGZS	Chamber of Agriculture
KONTR	Organic farming inspection and certification body
LDS	Slovenian Liberal Democrats Party, ecological forum
MKGP	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food, Department for Sustainable Agriculture
MOPE	Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and Energy
MZ	Ministry of Health
NSI	New Slovenia Party, committee for agriculture
SDS	Slovenian Social Democratic Party, movement for rural development
SKS	Slovenian farmers' union
SMS	Slovenian Youth Party
SPOK	Committee for Agriculture at the Slovenian Parliament
TNP	Triglav National Park
UMANOT	Foundation for Sustainable Development
URSV	Office for consumers' protection
USOFA	Umbrella organization of organic farming
ZLSD	Slovenian Social Democrats Party


Table 7-10: Different measures of policy networks in Slovenia

	reputational power for organic farming policy*	reputational power for general farming policy*	betweenness centrality
<i>state institutions</i>			
MKGP	76%	88%	25%
MOPE	18%	35%	7%
MZ	12%	0%	0%
URSVP	0%	0%	0%
<i>political parties and parliament</i>			
LDS	0%	0%	4%
NSI	0%	6%	0%
SDS	0%	6%	0%
SMS	0%	6%	0%
SPOK	6%	35%	5%
ZLSD	0%	6%	0%
<i>organic farming organizations</i>			
USOFA (ZZEKS)	94%	6%	1%
<i>general farming organizations</i>			
SKS	6%	41%	7%
<i>environmental organizations</i>			
UMANOT	12%	0%	5%
<i>others</i>			
BIOFAC	18%	29%	0%
KONTR	41%	0%	7%
KGZS	71%	82%	22%
TNP	12%	0%	0%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as one of the five most important actors for organic / general farming policy

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

Figure 7-11: Organic farming policy network in Switzerland



Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04); created with Visone

Abbreviations

AGORA	Farmers' union in the French-speaking part of Switzerland
BIOSUISSE	Swiss organic farmers' association
BLW	Swiss Federal Office for Agriculture
Coop	One of the main retailers in Switzerland
CVP	Swiss Conservative Party
ECOS	Swiss umbrella organization of the economy
ETH-IAW	Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics at the ETH (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich)
FDP	Swiss Liberal Party
FIBL	Research Institute of Organic Agriculture
GPS	Swiss Green Party
IPSUISSE	Swiss organization for integrated agriculture
LDK	Conference of agricultural directors of the cantons
Migros	One of the main retailers in Switzerland
PRONAT	Environmental organization
SBV	Swiss Farmers' union
SKS	Swiss association for consumer protection
SMP	Swiss association of milk producers
SPS	Swiss Social Democratic Party
STS	Swiss organization for the prevention of cruelty to animals
SVP	Swiss people's party
VKMB	Association of small and medium sized farmers
WWF	Swiss branch of the World Wide Fund for Nature

Table 7-11: Different measures of policy networks in Switzerland

	reputational power for organic farming policy*	reputational power for general farming policy*	betweenness centrality
<i>state institutions</i>			
BLW	73%	95%	1%
LDK	0%	0%	0%
<i>political parties</i>			
CVP	0%	5%	0%
FDP	0%	5%	0%
GPS	9%	5%	1%
SPS	14%	9%	0%
SVP	0%	14%	0%
<i>organic farming organizations</i>			
BIO SUISSE	95%	14%	15%
<i>general farming organizations</i>			
SBV	23%	95%	3%
AGORA	0%	9%	0%
<i>environmental organizations</i>			
PRONAT	14%	9%	0%
STS	5%	18%	0%
WWF	23%	9%	1%
IP SUISSE	0%	5%	0%
<i>retailers</i>			
COOP	73%	64%	0%
MIGROS	41%	59%	0%
<i>others</i>			
ECOS	0%	41%	0%
ETH-IAW	0%	27%	0%
FIBL	59%	5%	5%
SKS	27%	27%	0%
SMP	0%	41%	0%
VKMB	9%	27%	3%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as one of the five most important actors for organic / general farming policy

Source: own data (national actor interviews, winter 2003/04)

7.3

List of actors interviewed during the EU level interview survey

Organization/ Institution	Person interviewed
DG AGRI.F.4	H. van Boxem
DG ENVI	B. Berger
ECOSOC	S. Calamandarei
EP – Green Faction	F. W. Gräfe zu Baringdorf
PR Austria	M. Fladl
PR Germany	W. Trunk
PR Denmark	L. Breum Larsen
PR France	D. Gomel
BEUC	B. Kettlitz
Birdlife International	F. Schöne
CEJA	H. Christensen
COPA	E. Corral
EEB	A. Berkhuisen
EFFAT	A. Spahn
Eurocoop	L. Ousted-Olson
FoEE	M. Konecny
IFOAM EU Group	M. Schlüter

7.4 Reputational power of EU level actors for organic and general farming policy

Table 7-12: Reputation of actors for organic farming policy at the EU level

Policy actor	Reputational power*
Member States / COUNCIL	59%
IFOAM EU	47%
Commission	35%
COPA	29%
DE	24%
NAT-OFORG	24%
DK	18%
DG-AGRI	18%
EP	18%
AT	12%
SCO	12%
IT	6%
ES	6%
DG-ENVI	6%
DG-SANCO	6%
DG-TRADE	6%
DG-RTD	6%
ABL	6%
IEEP	6%
ELO	6%
EOFF	6%
BEUC	6%
COOP	6%
DEMETER International	6%
"The market in general"	6%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming this actor as one of the three most important

Source: own data (EU-level actor interviews, autumn 2004)

Table 7-13: Reputation of actors for general farming policy at the EU level

Policy actor	reputational power*
Member States/ COUNCIL	53%
COPA	53%
FR	35%
COMM	35%
WTO	29%
DE	24%
DG-AGRI	18%
CoAM	18%
EP	18%
ES	12%
CoFM	12%
Trade unions	12%
IT	6%
GR	6%
IT	6%
UK	6%
New EU member states	6%
BEUC	6%
ABL	6%
Environmental and consumers' NGOs	6%

* indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming this actor as one of the three most important

Source: own data (EU-level actor interviews, autumn 2004)